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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment.  It is 
beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a 
police officer – are not covered by the Constitution’s free speech clause.1  
But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about 
military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection.2  To date, 
however, it has largely been taken for granted in Supreme Court doctrine 
and academic writing that any constitutional protection for lies is purely 
prophylactic – it provides protection to the truth-speaker by also 
                                                                                                     
1  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012).  See also United States v. Chappell, 
691 F.3d 388, 400 (4th Cir. 2012).  There is an important difference between what speech is 
covered by the First Amendment and what speech is protected.  As Professor Schauer has 
observed, the question of First Amendment coverage is all too often “simply assumed.”  Frederick 
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional 
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004). 
2  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(finding false speech that injures reputation is protected by the First Amendment). 




protecting the liar.3  What remains unresolved is whether other rationales 
might also justify First Amendment protection for lies. 
This Article argues that some lies – what we call high value lies – 
have intrinsic or instrumental value to the goals underlying freedom of 
speech.  It develops a trifurcated doctrinal taxonomy of constitutional 
protection for lies.  Some misrepresentations receive no protection at all;4 
some false statements are protected only because the protection of the liar 
ensures that the speech of the truthful person is not indirectly chilled,5 
and, in our view, some lies must be protected for their own sake.  This 
framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important because we 
provide the first comprehensive look at the wide range of lies that may 
raise First Amendment issues in the wake of United States v. Alvarez,6  
and analyze the proper level constitutional scrutiny owed to regulations 
of each type of lie.   
Beyond doctrine, we advance the thesis that constitutional protection 
for high value lies is firmly rooted in First Amendment theory because 
false speech sometimes paradoxically facilitates or produces truth.  High 
value lies, though unacknowledged in the literature and cases to date, 
have played an important role in American history, and affirmatively 
further the free speech goals of enhancing political discourse, revealing 
of truth, and promoting individual autonomy. 7  A prototypical category 
of high value lies is what we label “investigative deceptions.” An 
investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order 
                                                                                                     
3  Just as the application of the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations results in 
the suppression of valuable evidence on the justification that its exclusion is necessary to protect 
the innocent from police overreaching, and not because of the inherent benefits for criminals, see, 
e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 
(2009), so too the protection of lies has been justified as necessary to the protection of the non-
liar.  The Court has expressed ambivalence about both the exclusionary rule and constitutional 
protection for lies, but tends to reluctantly recognize carefully tailored application of the 
protections as a necessary evil. 
4  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2014) (upheld in United States v. Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d 
1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
5  See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986). 
6  132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
7  There are only two previous scholarly treatments of this issue of which we are aware. 
Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat 
Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (2006); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 
2012 S. CT. REV. 161.  In examining lies more generally, Professor Varat’s insightful article 
includes a subsection on “Lies Designed to Procure the Truth,” which sets out some of the 
challenges that we address comprehensively in this Article.  53 UCLA L. REV. at 1122-26.  In 
trying to predict the implications of the Court’s decision in Alvarez, Professor Norton 
acknowledges that “[s]ome lies have instrumental or even moral value,” 2012 S. CT. REV. at 164, 
though she does not emphasize the types of investigative deceptions on which our work focuses. 
For an argument that lying may sometimes be protected speech on moral grounds, see R. George 
Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1131, 1157-58 (2011). 
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for an undercover journalist, investigator, or political activist to gain 
access to information or images of great political significance that would 
not be available if the person disclosed her media affiliations or political 
objectives.  Investigative deceptions are affirmative misrepresentations 
or omissions about one’s political or journalistic affiliations, educational 
backgrounds, or research, reporting, or political motives to facilitate 
gaining access to truthful information on matters of substantial public 
concern.8  
We develop our claim by examining the confluence of two 
contemporary developments concerning the law of free speech – the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez and the emergence of new laws 
aimed at restricting undercover investigations or whistleblowing, 
particularly the so-called “Ag Gag” laws.9  Ag Gag laws provide a timely 
and straightforward case study of the First Amendment’s role in 
protecting high value lies because a key component of these laws is the 
criminalization of misrepresentations made in order to gain access to 
agricultural facilities.10  Under these laws, lies used to facilitate 
                                                                                                     
8  Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2014 WL 4388158, at*2 (D. 
Idaho Sep. 4, 2014). 
9  The term “Ag Gag” was coined by food writer Mark Bittman.  Mark Bittman, Op-Ed., 
Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, A27.  As we discuss below, Ag Gag laws 
seek to stifle or gag whistleblowing and reporting regarding practices at commercial agricultural 
facilities.  Several articles have addressed the First Amendment implications of Ag Gag laws from 
a doctrinal perspective, but none have situated the discussion against the background of First 
Amendment theory.  See, e.g., Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of Laws 
Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960 
(2012); Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How 
United States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 566 (2014). 
10  Since 2012, more than 25 such bills have been introduced.    See Ag-Gag Bills at the State 
Level, AM. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, http://www.aspca.org/fight-
cruelty/advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislation/ag-gag-bills-state-level 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015); Elizabeth Barclay, 2013 Was The Year Bills To Criminalize Animal 
Cruelty Videos Failed, NPR (Dec. 27, 2013, 10:39AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/12/19/255549796/2013-was-the-year-every-new-ag-gag-
bill-failed; Ariel Garlow, Why Factory Farms Are Afraid of Us Looking in, ONE GREEN PLANET 
(June 24, 2014), http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/why-the-factory-farms-are-
afraid-of-us-looking-in/. 




information-gathering for a news story,11 an academic book,12 or political 
mobilization13 are all criminalized.14   
At least since Upton Sinclair lied to gain critical access to the 
meatpacking industry to gather information for his novel, THE JUNGLE, 
investigators have been misrepresenting their identities and motives to 
expose unlawful and unethical behavior to the light of day.15  This Article 
is the first to consider the relationship between these high value lies and 
the First Amendment.  It proceeds in four parts.  In Part II, we explore the 
current jurisprudence and scholarship about lying under the First 
Amendment.  Here, we trace the development of the law from earlier 
understandings that seemed to categorically exclude lying from First 
Amendment coverage, to a contemporary, post-Alvarez, binary 
understanding of free speech theory – some lies are protected and others 
are not.  In Part III, we explore the interaction of the practical realities of 
lying – a complex and varied social phenomena – and the theoretical 
underpinnings of the First Amendment.  We demonstrate that 
investigative deceptions are valuable as a historical and political matter 
and that they ought not to be relegated to the status of valueless speech.  
Next, in Part IV, we argue that these lies affirmatively serve the purposes 
of free speech – they promote democratic self-governance, enhance the 
search for broader truths, and facilitate speakers’ autonomy and self-
determination.  Finally, in Part V, we build on this to show how Ag Gag 
laws and other government regulations of lying as part of undercover 
investigations ought to be evaluated within the framework of existing 
First Amendment doctrine.  In short, we introduce, define and distinguish, 
and provide a doctrinal framework for understanding high value lies 
under the First Amendment.   
 
                                                                                                     
11  See, e.g., HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Ted Conover Goes Undercover as a USDA Meat 
Inspector, THE HARPER’S BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013 2:37 AM), http://harpers.org/blog/2013/04/ted-
conover-goes-undercover-as-a-usda-meat-inspector/.  
12  See, e.g., TIMOTHY PACHIRAT, EVERY TWELVE SECONDS: INDUSTRIALIZED SLAUGHTER AND 
THE POLITICS OF SIGHT 15-17 (2011). 
13  See, e.g., Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969-70 (2012) (undercover video 
exposing animal abuse in slaughterhouse prompted change in statute governing treatment of 
animals). 
14  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(a) (2014).  Many Ag Gag laws also criminalize 
the act of recording itself, which raises equally important First Amendment concerns.  In a future 
article, we plan to examine more specifically the concept of image capture as speech.  For a 
general treatment of this topic, see Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First 
Amendment:  Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 370-74 
(2011). 
15  See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE:  THE TREATMENT OF LIES AS 
EXPRESSION 
 
As far back as the early twentieth century, the Court articulated a 
principle of free speech familiar to most laypeople – you can’t falsely 
shout fire in a crowded theater.16  This common platitude embodies two 
underlying premises supporting the claim that false factual statements are 
not protected by the First Amendment – (1) they have no value (false 
factual statements do not promote democracy, do not, by definition, 
advance the search for truth, and contribute little if anything to the 
speaker’s autonomy); and (2) they cause tangible social harm 
(unnecessarily alarming people will cause panic, leading to physical 
injuries).17   
But in law, as in life, not all lies are alike.  Accordingly, in examining 
whether some lies ought to receive First Amendment protection, it is 
important to understand precisely why the Court has tolerated laws that 
regulate false speech and to distinguish among the types of false 
statements – do lies have value, and what is the harm to society caused 
by lies? 
 
A. Lies as No Value Speech 
 
Free speech doctrine under the First Amendment has long been 
understood to follow the so-called two level speech theory.  Under this 
approach, speech that is considered to have “high value” is entitled to 
robust, though not unlimited, First Amendment protection.  Under much 
free speech theory, the value of a type of expression is measured in a 
utilitarian sense by determining that expression’s contribution to the 
functions the First Amendment is said to advance – promotion of 
democratic self-governance,18 facilitating the broader search for truth 
(beyond the political realm),19 and enhancing the speaker’s self-
                                                                                                     
16  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
17  Although two level speech theory focuses primarily on the value of expression, the Court 
also tends to examine the social harms associated with a category of speech when determining 
whether it is covered by the First Amendment.  For categories of expression deemed unprotected, 
the Court’s normal mistrust of government justifications is set aside, not only because these types 
of speech have no or little value but also because the states’ interests are not speculative, but 
tangible and easily understood.  Thus, fighting words may have no value, but they also arguably 
may provoke immediate physical violence.  Obscenity is said not to facilitate any traditional 
speech value, but also may undermine societal morals and cause harm to women.  And so forth. 
18  See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 75 
(1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
26 (1971). 
19  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 




realization and autonomy.20  High value speech is subject to the most 
stringent constitutional protection, and typically cannot be regulated on 
the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of her expression.21   
In contrast, on a more or less case-by-case basis, the Supreme Court 
has determined that some categories of speech fall entirely outside the 
First Amendment’s coverage.22  The second tier of speech is made up of 
essentially unprotected expressive activities.  Absent another 
constitutional limitation, the government may not only regulate speech 
that falls outside of the free speech clause, but also can ban it altogether.  
While the two level theory of speech has been incisively criticized for 
decades,23 the Supreme Court at least formally clings to the approach as 
part of its doctrinal implementation of the First Amendment.24 
The longest standing expression of the two level theory comes from 
the often quoted dictum in the Court’s fighting words case, Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire.25  There, in declaring that speech rights under the First 
Amendment are not absolute, the Court listed several categories of speech 
that fall beyond its coverage.  “There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These 
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or ‘fighting’ words.”26  In addition to the implied historical pedigree27 of 
                                                                                                     
20  See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982); 
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 217-18 (1972) 
[hereinafter, Scanlon, Theory].  Other theorists argue that such constructivist or consequentialist 
approaches are not helpful to understanding free speech.  See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE 
A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 131 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel 
Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 690-91 (2013). 
21  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994). 
22  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (describing the categories of 
unprotected speech). 
23    See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-12 (1960). 
24    Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (“From 1791 to the present, however, the First Amendment has 
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a 
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. These historic and traditional categories long 
familiar to the bar.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25  315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
26  Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added). 
27  In a forthcoming article, Genevieve Lakier discredits this historical narrative and 
demonstrates through her research that neither the Supreme Court nor other federal or state courts 
in the period prior to the New Deal routinely recognized categories of low value speech.  
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, (manuscript at 8-11) available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498741 (forthcoming, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
___).  Indeed, there was both more and less First Amendment protection for categories of speech 
that the modern Court deems as having no or little value.  On one hand, prior restraints were 
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these categories of unprotected speech, the Court articulated a functional 
rationale for their exclusion from the First Amendment.  “It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.”28  Simply put, under the two level theory, some 
types of speech have little or no value and therefore receive no protection. 
Among the categories of unprotected, or only partially protected, 
expression are several types of speech that involve false statements of 
fact, or more bluntly, lies and misrepresentations.  The Supreme Court 
has long suggested that “there is no such thing as a false idea,”29 premised 
on the notion that truth is optimally derived from free and open discourse, 
including the rebuttal and challenge of even the most outrageous or 
“false” ideas or beliefs.30  Untruthful statements of fact are another 
matter, because they are said to neither advance public discourse nor 
promote individual self-realization. 
For decades, then, it was assumed that false factual statements are of 
no value to public discourse and thus fell entirely outside of the First 
Amendment’s protections.  The Court was unequivocal on this point.  For 
example, it repeatedly observed that “there is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.”31  Similarly, it declared that “[n]either lies nor 
false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one 
suggests their desirability or further proliferation.”32  In equally clear 
language, the Court confirmed that “the knowingly false statement and 
the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.”33  Through these repeated and definitive 
holdings, it became axiomatic that lying is “no value” speech and is 
therefore not covered by the First Amendment.   
But these claims themselves were never closely examined and were 
probably never completely true.  Lies have been painted with too broad a 
brush.  They are assumed to lack value, but little or no effort has been 
spent trying to differentiate among types of lies.  The remainder of this 
section takes up this task of creating a taxonomy of lies, and explores 
                                                                                                     
presumptively invalid for all categories of speech.  Id. at 27-29.  On the other hand, criminal 
penalties on both high and low value speech were tolerated much more than they are today.  Id. 
28  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added). 
29  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
30  Id. at 339-40 (“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction 
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
31  Id. at 340. 
32  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968). 
33  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 
389 (1967) (“the constitutional [speech] guarantees can tolerate sanctions against calculated 
falsehoods without significant impairment of their essential function.”) (emphasis added). 




whether differences among lies ought to lead to a distinction in the degree 
of constitutional protection to which they are afforded. 
 
B. Lies That May Be Prohibited Because of a Strong Government 
Interest 
 
The two level theory of speech has substantially evolved in the 73 
years since Chaplinsky.  Some of the categories of no value speech the 
Court listed no longer count among the realm of the unprotected.34  The 
fighting words doctrine itself has been withered by criticism and 
narrowed almost beyond recognition.35  But the central premise of the 
two level theory is still intact – some types of speech have no value under 
the First Amendment and may therefore be banned by the government.  
Indeed, since Chaplinsky, the Court has expanded the list of categories of 
unprotected speech to include true threats,36 child pornography,37 and 
expression that violates copyright laws.38 
Several different categories of lies also have been held to, or are 
assumed to, fall outside the First Amendment’s protection because they 
lack any social value and also cause tangible harms to third parties or to 
society at large.  Common law and statutory fraud provisions, which 
regulate fraudulent speech designed to induce listeners to give money to 
the speaker under false pretenses, are well-accepted examples of speech 
the government may regulate without much constitutional limitation.39  In 
                                                                                                     
34  See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (striking down conviction for lewd 
and profane language). 
35  See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1089 (6th ed. 2009) (“The Court 
has not upheld a conviction on the basis of the fighting words doctrine since Chaplinsky.  It has 
been argued that the Court’s post-Chaplinsky decisions have so narrowed the doctrine as to render 
it meaningless, and that the doctrine is ‘nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality 
that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expression.’” (citing 
Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980).).  
Moreover, the Court has managed to squeeze a third level into its historically binary model of 
speech, with certain categories of speech, such as incitement to unlawful activity, Hess v. Indiana, 
414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), non-obscene 
pornography, Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976), and commercial speech, 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 
(1980), deemed to be entitled to some, but not full, constitutional protection.   
36  See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
37  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
38  See Harper & Row Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1977). 
39  Other types of fraudulent inducement unrelated to financial gain may also fall outside the 
free speech clause.  For example, in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 333 (1920), the Court 
rejected a First Amendment claim by a person charged with discouraging military enlistment in 
part because his statements were deliberate misrepresentations. 
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Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,40 the Court 
rejected a First Amendment challenge by a professional charitable 
fundraising organization that was sued by the state for making false and 
misleading misrepresentations to donors.41  In doing so, it made it clear 
that “the First Amendment does not shield fraud.”42  Fraudulent speech 
bears no First Amendment value and also causes harm to those who are 
defrauded.43 
Similarly, the government has unquestioned power to regulate false 
statements of fact in the context of perjury.  It borders on absurd to argue 
that a person’s lies under oath would advance any First Amendment 
values, since such speech obscures, rather than leads to, truth finding.  
Indeed, judicial proceedings are designed to smoke out the truth and 
resolve disputes; lies that distort or disable the judicial process are 
assumed to be harmful to these goals beyond any doubt.44  Perjured 
testimony can lead to harm to third parties (say, a wrongfully convicted 
criminal defendant), to the justice system itself (by undermining its 
ability to accurately resolve disputes), and in some cases may materially 
benefit the speaker (by evading liability or justice).45  Not surprisingly, 
then, the Court has repeatedly classified perjury as speech beyond the 
First Amendment’s protection.46  The same could be said for laws that 
prohibit or criminalize making false statements to government officials 
in the course of their official duties.47   
                                                                                                     
40  538 U.S. 600 (2003). 
41  Id. at 624. 
42  Id. at 612.  Although fraud is generally not covered by the First Amendment, government 
regulations directed at fraud are not immune from scrutiny.  The Court has, for example, frowned 
upon broad, prior restraints aimed at preventing fraudulent speech, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 
U.S. 147, 164 (1939), and has also invalidated prophylactic measures automatically categorizing 
certain types of charitable solicitations as fraudulent for fear of overreaching and limiting 
charitable solicitation as speech, Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 800 
(1988); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984); Village of Schaumburg 
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980). 
43  In other areas in which the government regulates fraud, there is frequently not even a 
discussion or consideration of First Amendment limitations because the issue is treated as self-
evident.  See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an 
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 641-42 (2006) 
(observing the many ways in which securities regulations affect speech yet are assumed to fall 
outside of First Amendment scrutiny).  See generally Schauer, supra note 1, at 1767 (“whether 
the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply 
assumed.”). 
44  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (“Perjured testimony “is at war 
with justice” because it can cause a court to render a “judgment not resting on truth.””) (citation 
omitted).  
45  Id. at 2546. 
46  See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961). 
47  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546. 




Other forms of misrepresentation that threaten the good standing and 
appearance of government processes also fall outside of the First 
Amendment, even when the misrepresentation is not made under oath.   
For instance, when a private citizen falsely represents that he or she is a 
police officer or other government official, that statement is not protected 
speech.48  Like the preceding examples, this type of speech has the effect 
not of advancing democracy or facilitating the search for truth, but of 
interfering with these functions.  Speakers who engage in this conduct 
risk undermining the integrity of government processes and potentially 
misrepresenting or misappropriating the position and power of the state.49  
As the Court has explained, statutes criminalizing the impersonation of 
public officials serve to avoid tangible harm to “the general good repute 
and dignity of the (government) service itself.”50  There is simply 
something different about pretending to be an agent of the government.  
These lies always present a risk of injury to the public reputation of the 
office or institution in question.51  In addition, because government actors 
have the imprimatur of official authority, misrepresenting oneself as 
having such authority presents special dangers to third parties, who 
believe they are dealing with, and may succumb to, one who has the 
backing and authority of the State.52  It is for this very reason that in civil 
rights litigation, actions under the color of state authority are considered 
to pose a particular threat to individual liberty.53  Consistent with the 
current law, we believe that impersonating a public official is a unique 
category of lying that, even when done in an investigative context, falls 
outside the First Amendment’s scope. 
Still another category of deception that is generally exempted from 
First Amendment protection is commercial speech.54  At one time, the 
                                                                                                     
48  See United States v. Swisher, 711 F.3d 514, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 
392 (4th Cir. 2012). 
49  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.  See also Norton, supra note 7, at 198 (observing that lying 
about being a law enforcement officer harms “the public’s trust in, and thus the effectiveness of, 
law enforcement.”). 
50 United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943). 
51 Id. 
52  Norton, supra note 7, at 198. 
53  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't 
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  See generally Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and 
Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 918 (2010) 
(arguing that Monroe “allowed suits against officials who violate constitutional rights while 
clothed, sometimes quite literally, in judicial robes or police uniforms, giving them the imprimatur 
of the state's power.”). 
54  Commercial speech is “expression that is related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience.”  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
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Court categorically excluded commercial speech from First Amendment 
coverage.55  More recently, the Court has recognized that commercial 
speech may have substantial value because it advances the economic 
interests of the speaker and provides important information to consumers 
and society at large.56  But the Court has made it clear that the government 
has wide latitude to regulate false or misleading commercial speech.  As 
it wrote in Central Hudson, “there can be no constitutional objection to 
the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform 
the public about lawful activity.  The government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”57  As 
with the preceding categories of lies that are beyond the scope of 
constitutional protection, false or misleading commercial speech is not 
valuable to the ends served by the First Amendment and also has the 
potential to cause harm to those who are misled by it.58 
 
 
C. Lies That Are Protected In Order to Avoid Chilling (as Opposed 
to Generating) Truthful Speech 
 
The Court strongly suggested in its Chaplinsky dicta that libel has no 
First Amendment value because defamatory statements serve no truth 
finding function and also cause harm to those whose reputations are 
damaged by them.59  Since Chaplinsky, however, the Court has developed 
a complicated and idiosyncratic set of First Amendment rules for 
evaluating state defamation laws that provides robust protection for false 
statements directed at public officials and public figures.60  In the seminal 
case of New York Times v. Sullivan,61 the Court reviewed a $500,000 
judgment on a defamation claim brought by a Montgomery, Alabama 
county commissioner against several civil rights activists and a major 
                                                                                                     
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (distinguishing between truthful and deceptive commercial 
speech). 
55  Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Va. Pharmacy, 501 U.S. 
at 755. 
56  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (recognizing intermediate scrutiny as the proper 
scrutiny for content-based restrictions on commercial speech); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984). 
57  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
58  For further elaboration of categories of false factual statements that are not covered by the 
First Amendment, see Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 3-11, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 
2011 WL 3693418, at *3-*11. 
59  315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  
60  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1965) (imposing severe limitations 
on libel claims brought by public officials); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) 
(extending Sullivan standard to public figures). 
61  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256. 




newspaper.  The newspaper had published the activists’ advertisement 
criticizing the local police, who were ostensibly under the 
commissioner’s direction, for engaging in conduct that was antagonistic 
toward civil rights demonstrators.  It was undisputed that some of the 
factual statements contained in the ad were inaccurate.  The trial judge 
had instructed the jury that these types of statements constituted libel per 
se, meaning that the plaintiff need not prove actual harm or malicious 
intent on the speakers’ part in order to recover damages.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama courts’ rulings 
upholding the defamation verdict against the defendants.  Rejecting the 
claim that defamatory statements are categorically unprotected by the 
First Amendment, the Court distinguished prior cases addressing free 
speech and defamation because they did not involve statements critical 
of public officials, observing that this dispute must be evaluated “against 
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”62  In direct conflict 
with the language in Chaplinsky, the Court stated that “libel can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.”63 
 In the context of criticism of government officials or heated debate 
on important public issues, the Court recognized that speech would 
sometimes be exaggerated or even contain false statements.64  It went on 
to observe that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that 
it must be protected if the freedom of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive.’”65  These factors directly 
shaped the scope of the applicable First Amendment protections.   
The Court held that where defamation claims are brought by public 
officials against speakers who criticize their conduct, those claims may 
not be upheld unless the plaintiff can show that the speaker’s statement 
was made with “actual malice,” meaning that the speaker made the 
defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false, or with reckless 
disregard for its falsity.66  In addition, the Court held that in order to 
ensure that speech is not chilled, states must require plaintiffs to prove 
the defendants’ state of mind by clear and convincing evidence.67  The 
point of imposing this high burden on public official defamation plaintiffs 
                                                                                                     
62  Id. at 270. 
63  Id. at 269. 
64  Id. at 271 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)). 
65  Id. at 271-72. 
66  Id. at 279-80. 
67  Id. at 285-86. 
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was not that the false statements themselves had intrinsic value, but that 
if critics of the government were exposed to substantial tort liability, they 
might rein in their rhetoric in ways that would result in self-censorship of 
even truthful criticisms.68  Later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the 
Court applied these same heightened protections to defendants accused 
of defamation against  any “public figures,” “nonpublic persons who ‘are 
nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public 
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to 
society at large.’”69 
The Supreme Court has also extended the New York Times standard 
to so-called “false light” invasion of privacy claims under state tort law.  
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,70 the Court reviewed a tort judgment against a news 
magazine that had published an article and photo spread connected to the 
opening of a fictional play loosely based on an actual crime involving 
individuals who held a Pennsylvania family hostage in their home.  The 
family complained that the magazine story represented the play as 
accurately depicting the actual crime when in fact the play had 
embellished and altered the story in significant ways.  The Supreme Court 
invalidated the jury’s verdict for the family on the ground that the First 
Amendment protected the freedom of speech and of the press in the 
publication of material about matters of public concern.71 
                                                                                                     
68  Id. at 279.  The Court did allow that false speech might actually play a role in public 
discourse to the extent that it might increase the chance that truthful counter-speech would emerge 
in response. Id. at 279 n.19.  The Court extended the New York Times standard to criminal libel 
claims in Garrison v. Louisiana.  379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
69  388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).  The majority had characterized 
public figures as those who “commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest at 
the time of the publications.” Butts, 388 U.S. at 154.  The opinion for the Court articulated a 
slightly different standard, requiring that plaintiffs must show that the speaker engaged in “highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and 
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”  Id. at 155.  A majority of the Justices, 
however, endorsed extending the New York Times standard to these cases as well, meaning that 
the plaintiff must show that the speaker knew that the allegedly defamatory statements were false 
or showed reckless disregard for their truth.  Id. at 162.  This standard was contained in Chief 
Justice Warren’s opinion, but commanded the majority of the Court.  See Gertz v Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974).  In Gertz, however, the Court rejected extending the heightened 
proof standard to defamation claims brought by private persons, even when the statements related 
to a highly publicized incident in which the public had a great interest.  Even where private citizens 
are involved, however, the Court said that the state may not impose liability for defamatory 
statements without imposing some sort of fault standard.  Id. at 347.  Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (plurality) (holding that defamation of private 
person about matters of private concern was not limited by the First Amendment). 
70  385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
71  Id. at 387-88 (limiting liability for state invasion of privacy torts to cases where the 
plaintiff shows that the speech was undertaken with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard 
for its truth.). 




As in the context of defamation, the Court’s limitation of state privacy 
torts was based not on the value of the false or inaccurate statements in 
the article, but on the fear that zealous enforcement of state law to police 
untrue statements would likely suppress a wide range of speech, 
including truthful speech about matters of public concern.  It expressed 
concern that such tort liability would create a chilling effect and “saddle 
the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts 
associated in news articles with a person’s name, picture or portrait, 
particularly as related to nondefamatory matter.”72 
Another context in which the Court has deemed false speech to be 
constitutionally protected is in its assessment of the First Amendment 
implications of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court reviewed a tort judgment 
against a magazine that published a parody in the form of a fake liquor 
advertisement implying that a nationally known, politically active 
minister had lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse.73  The Court 
overturned a state court judgment that imposed substantial civil liability 
on the magazine, holding that this type of penalty for even an 
“outrageous” parody of a public figure cannot withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the there was 
a false statement of fact made with knowledge of the its falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth of the matter.74  Recognizing a long history of 
parodies of public figures in political and other public discourse, the 
Court concluded that the threat of tort liability could create a chilling 
effect in the absence of a more restrictive standard.75 
As these cases illustrate, the Court’s broad unequivocal language that 
“there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact” 76 does not 
tell the entire story.  In reality, the Court has parsed out false speech into 
different categories and distinguished them by their nature and context as 
well as by considering whether their protection might be necessary to 
enhance the universe of speech available to the public at large.  But in 
each of these contexts, the Court’s rationale for protecting the statements 
speech was to prevent the chilling of truthful speech, not because it 
considered the false speech to have any value. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
72  Id. at 389. 
73  485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988). 
74  Id. at 56. 
75  Id. at 52-55.  The Court may well have been concerned that without a higher threshold of 
liability, public figure plaintiffs might circumvent the New York Times rule by recasting their 
defamation claims as emotional distress actions. 
76  Gertz. 418 U.S. at 340. 
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D. The Beginning of a New Era:  United States v. Alvarez and 
Protecting Lies That Serve No Public Value 
 
It is safe to say that prior to 2012, the Court only allowed for First 
Amendment protection of false statements of fact when the dangers of 
government regulation of that speech outweighed any harms caused by 
the falsehoods.  A balancing of the harm caused and the potential value 
of the lies was critical.  However, in Alvarez, the Court struck down the 
Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute that makes it a crime for anyone to 
“falsely represent himself or herself, verbally or in writing to have been 
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States.”77  Alvarez, a local water board official, was 
convicted of violating the Act when he boasted during a water board 
meeting that he had been awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor for 
his military service.78  The Court invalidated Alvarez’s conviction, 
holding that the Act violated the First Amendment right of free speech.79   
The lie at issue in Alvarez is little more than a valueless act of self-
promotion and impersonation, and the government had identified a 
variety of harms to the military community when its honors are diluted in 
this way.80  Nonetheless, the Court held that such a lie was 
constitutionally protected.  Alvarez, then, reflects a turning point:  a lie of 
little or no value and that arguably caused some harm was nonetheless 
deemed protected speech. 
However, the decision was a fractured one, resulting in a legal 
framework that remains uncertain.  Justice Kennedy wrote for a four 
Justice plurality, which declared that false speech is not categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment, and stated that strict scrutiny should 
be applied to the Act, which it deemed to be a content-based regulation 
of pure speech.81  Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, wrote an 
opinion concurring in the judgment, but argued that the Court ought to 
apply an intermediate standard of scrutiny that involved a balancing of 
the law’s threat to free expression against the government’s interest in 
regulating the speech.82 
Underlying the reasoning of all six Justices who supported the 
judgment in Alvarez is the clear rejection of the proposition that lies are 
entitled to “no protection at all” under the First Amendment.83  In this 
                                                                                                     
77 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2013). 
78  Id. at 2542. 
79  Id. at 2551. 
80  Id. at 2549.  
81  Id. at 2543. 
82  Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
83  Id. at 2553. 




regard, there is a holding of the Court – a common denominator of 
reasoning84 – that some lies are protected.  Equally notable, Alvarez 
departs somewhat from the two level theory of speech by, as noted above, 
recognizing that Alvarez’s false statements were protected despite the 
fact that they lacked either intrinsic or instrumental social value.85  Both 
the plurality and concurring opinions regarded Alvarez’s lies as nothing 
more than a valueless, “pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded 
him,”86 yet they viewed the lie as fully protected by the First Amendment.   
 That is not to say that Alvarez opens the floodgates to First 
Amendment protection for all lies.  The traditional categories of 
unprotected lies that we discuss above – defamation, false commercial 
speech, perjury, and impersonating government officials – were all 
acknowledged as beyond the scope of the First Amendment.87  But for 
the first time the Court also recognized a distinct set of lies that warranted 
protection, and the six Justices in the majority fundamentally agreed on 
the limiting principles that apply in this context.  Both the plurality and 
concurring decisions share the view that punishing “falsity alone” is not 
permissible; instead the government may only regulate false speech when 
there is some “intent to injure”88 or more precisely some intent to cause 
a “legally cognizable harm.”89  As the plurality clearly explains, “There 
must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury 
to be prevented.”90 
 While there are not yet a substantial number of cases applying 
Alvarez, the early indications are that lower courts are taking the cue and 
applying broad protections to lies.  For example, two lower federal courts 
have invalidated state laws regulating false speech in the context of 
political campaigns. 
In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson,91 the Eighth Circuit struck down 
a Minnesota law making it a misdemeanor for any person to intentionally 
participate in “the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid 
political advertising or campaign material . . . with respect to the effect 
                                                                                                     
84  Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and 
Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 171 (2009) (explaining that “D.C. Circuit held that a 
plurality decision rationale is only entitled to precedential weight if it is ‘implicitly approved by 
at least five Justices’” such that the holding reflects a common denominator of reasoning).  
85  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
86  Id. at 2542 (plurality opinion). 
87  Id. at 2544-45. 
88  Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263, n.15 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“falsity 
must be coupled with some other element of culpability, such as an intent to injure or defraud 
another person.”). 
89  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. a t2545. 
90  Id. at 2549. 
91  766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to . . . promote or defeat a 
ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or 
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.”92  
While recognizing that Alvarez did not render a majority opinion defining 
the appropriate standard of review, the court held that the Minnesota law 
must be subject to strict scrutiny because it regulated politically salient 
speech on the basis of its content, and held that the law was 
unconstitutional insofar as it was not narrowly tailored.93  Ultimately, 
then, as in the Supreme Court’s defamation cases, the appellate court 
invalidated the law because of its potential to chill political speech, which 
often involves highly charged statements that might be deemed by 
opponents to be “false.”94  Similarly, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio 
Elections Committee,95 a federal district court issued a permanent 
injunction preventing the state from enforcing its false campaign speech 
law.  To a substantial degree, the court in this case used the same 
reasoning as the Eighth Circuit in 281 Care Committee to hold that the 
Ohio law violated the First Amendment.96   
Cases like these illustrate the emergence of a distinct jurisprudence 
of lying under the First Amendment.  Prior to Alvarez, it is unlikely that 
such statutes would have been invalidated.  Of note, however, neither the 
false campaign speech cases nor Alvarez provide protection for the lies at 
issue on the ground that the lies had some intrinsic or inherent political 
value.  Quite the contrary.  As the district court in Susan B. Anthony List 
noted, the plaintiff, an anti-abortion advocacy group, was not asserting a 
“right” to lie, but a right “not to have the truth of our political statements 
judged by the Government.”97 
 
III.  A HISTORY OF HIGH VALUE LIES – INVESTIGATIVE DECEPTIONS 
 
Lying is a complex behavioral phenomenon.  In the abstract, lying is 
typically viewed with almost universal moral opprobrium.  But this 
assumes that all lies are identical; in fact, context is critical to evaluating 
whether lies are harmful.98  Indeed, lying in the abstract is not even 
                                                                                                     
92  Id. at 778. 
93  Id. at 784. The court did not actually determine whether the state’s interest was compelling 
or not.  Id. at 787. 
94  Id. at 793.  
95  No. 1:10-cv-720, 2014 WL 4472634, at *2. 
96  Id. at *13. 
97  Id. at *1. 
98  In his opinion concurring with the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Alvarez, 
Judge Kozinski recognized the importance of context.  As he wrote,  
[a]ccording to our dissenting colleagues, “non-satirical and non-theatrical[ ] 
knowingly false statements of fact are always unprotected” by the First Amendment. 




forbidden by the Ten Commandments.99  Recent studies suggest that 
lying is common behavior, and in many contexts lying is not only not 
forbidden, but also can serve socially useful functions.100  As one 
commentator recently reported, “We all tell lies , and tell them shockingly 
often: Research shows that on average in an ordinary conversation, 
people lie two to three times every 10 minutes.”101  To be sure, many lies 
that society seems to tolerate are relatively trivial and socially acceptable, 
such as making a false statement to avoid hurting someone’s feelings.102  
As Justice Breyer observed in his concurring opinion in Alvarez: 
 
False factual statements can serve useful human 
objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they 
may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a 
person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or 
preserve a child's innocence; in public contexts, where 
they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the 
face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and 
scientific contexts, where (as Socrates' methods suggest) 
examination of a false statement (even if made 
deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought 
that ultimately helps realize the truth.103 
 
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that at least some types of lying for 
many purposes, perhaps even to gain employment, are socially 
tolerated.104   
There is also a long tradition of using deception as a means of gaining 
access to knowledge that would otherwise be obscured from public view.  
Since at least the Industrial Revolution, lies have played a central role in 
                                                                                                     
. . . Not “often,” not “sometimes,” but always.  Not “if the government has an 
important interest” nor “if someone’s harmed” nor “if it’s made in public,” but always.  
“Always” is a deliciously dangerous word, often eaten with a side of crow.   
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the denial 
of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted). 
99  Exodus 20:1-7 (King James). 
100  Ulrich Boser, We’re All Lying Liars: Why People Tell Lies, and Why White Lies Can Be 
OK, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 18, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://health.usnews.com/health-
news/family-health/brain-and-behavior/articles/2009/05/18/were-all-lying-liars-why-people-tell-
lies-and-why-white-lies-can-be-ok. 
101  Clancy Martin, Op-Ed., Good Lovers Lie, N.Y. TIMES SR4 (Feb. 8, 2015). 
102  Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
103  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
104  One recent job advice website even ran a story titled, “Why You Must Lie on Job 
Interviews.” Mark Stevens, Why You Must Lie On Job Interviews And What You Must Lie About, 
LINKEDIN (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141006125226-10136502-why-you-
must-lie-on-job-interviews-and-what-you-must-lie-about.  
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allowing the American public and the political branches of government 
exposure to the closed-door goings on of certain industries.  From 
prisons, to mental hospitals, to schools, to the meatpacking industry, lies 
have facilitated award-winning journalism, prompted changes in public 
behavior, and led to major legislative reforms.  Moreover, law 
enforcement has long engaged in investigative deceptions to gain access 
to private information without obtaining a warrant, and the Constitution 
has never stood as a barrier.105  In these and other ways, disclosure of 
politically salient and socially beneficial information that would have 
been kept secret but for investigative deceptions is critical to public 
discourse about important matters.  This section explores the potential 
First Amendment values of investigative deceptions by surveying several 
contexts in which both law and society embrace the use of lies to 
investigate wrongdoing. 
 
A.  Upton Sinclair and Lies 
 
Perhaps the most iconic example of using deception to uncover 
wrongdoing is Upton Sinclair’s investigation of the Chicago meatpacking 
industry, which became the source and inspiration for his path-breaking 
                                                                                                     
105  “The general rule is that government agents may use deception to gain access to homes, 
offices, or other places wherein illegal acts are being perpetrated. The Supreme Court has long 
acknowledged the use of trickery or deception to be permissible.”  Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. 
v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014).  Indeed, it has been acknowledged 
that “if total honesty by the police were to be constitutionally required, most undercover work 
would be effectively thwarted.”  Id. (noting that ruses may take many forms but often they are 
used to gain access to intimate areas or details, such as one’s home or one’s personal secrets). See 
also WAYNE LAFAVE, ET. AL. 2 CRIM. PROC. § 3.10(c) (3d ed. 2000) (summarizing Supreme Court 
authority on this point as generating the “following proposition: when an individual gives consent 
to another to intrude into an area or activity otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware 
that he will thereby reveal to this other person either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct, 
the consent is not vitiated merely because it would not have been given but for the nondisclosure 
or affirmative misrepresentation which made the consenting party unaware of the other person's 
identity”).  But see People v. Jefferson, 43 A.D.2d 112, 113, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1973) (per curiam) 
(finding a constitutional violation when the police lied about an emergency gas leak in the house 
that threatened health if not immediately inspected). 
Of course, holding that the Constitution does not forbid lying is a far cry from holding that 
lying is constitutionally protected.  But to the extent the Constitution is primarily a protection of 
citizens against the government, it is important to note how much deception has been permitted 
by the government in the name of information gathering.  See Chris Hamby, Government Set Up 
A Fake Facebook Page In This Woman’s Name, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014 6:16 PM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/government-says-federal-agents-can-impersonate-
woman-online#.favGY5LgX (detailing a government sting based on a false Facebook page using 
actual photos of an arrested person in an effort to gain communication with her affiliates).  It 
would be strange to suggest that the government has largely unchecked abilities to lie to persons 
to obtain deeply private information, while prohibiting private persons from engaging in limited 
deceptions in order to reveal non-intimate, business details of political significance. 




novel, THE JUNGLE.106  To gather information for his work, which he 
hoped would expose the many unfortunate ways in which meatpacking 
companies treated their employees,107 Sinclair gained access to the 
facilities by disguising himself as a worker.  “I would wander about the 
yards, and my friends would risk their jobs to show me what I wanted to 
see.  I was not much better dressed than the workers, and found that by 
the simple device of carrying a dinner pail I could go anywhere.”108  One 
of his biographers reports that the clothes and dinner pail were not quite 
enough, and that Sinclair gained access “armed with a few simple lies, 
appropriate to the area in which he was investigating.”109  Whether by 
commission or omission, it is clear that Sinclair gained access to the 
private workplaces of meatpacking plants through deception.  Moreover, 
to protect his cover, Sinclair could not afford to be seen taking notes of 
his observations.  Rather, he walked through the meatpacking plant, 
“memorizing details of what he saw, then rushing back to his room to 
write everything down.”110 
Like modern day animal rights and labor activists, Sinclair’s work 
was critical to exposing the unsavory practices of a wealthy and powerful 
industry to public scrutiny.  At the time he conducted his investigation, 
the livestock industry was already the nation’s largest and was beginning 
to control a bigger part of the global market.111  With all its resources, the 
industry was quite careful to cultivate its public image.  As one Sinclair 
biographer observed, “The packers were wiser about public relations than 
most businessmen of that era, arranging Potemkin village tours to 
carefully manicured parts of their plants and advertising their own virtues 
lavishly . . . .”112  Thus, it is fair to say that for more than a century 
undercover investigations have been critical to a politically important 
topic of speech that is otherwise unavailable to unscripted reporting.113 
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B.  Undercover Journalism and Lies 
 
Sinclair is characterized as one of the pioneers of “muckraking” 
journalism.114  Indeed, the history of modern journalism is filled with 
examples of journalists employing a wide range of devices to secure 
information for their stories, and passing that information on to the 
public.115  These efforts have ranged from simple omissions to outright 
lies.   
One example of a journalist lying to gain access to information for a 
story is Ken Silverstein, who, as an editor of Harper’s magazine, set out 
to do a story on how much Washington lobbyists promise to their foreign 
government clients.  Silverstein represented himself as the head of the 
Maldon Group, supposedly a collection of private investors who were 
exporters of natural gas from Turkemenistan, which had a government 
regime that he described as “Stalinist.”116  The supposed goal of hiring a 
lobbying firm was to show American policymakers that the reforms being 
undertaken by the Turkmeni government were real, which would help 
increase the chance of the Maldon Group’s business success.117  To 
support his scheme, Silverstein took what he called “minimal 
preparations.”118 
  
I printed up some Maldon Group business cards, giving myself 
the name “Kenneth Case” and giving the firm an address at a large 
office building in London, on Cavendish Square. I purchased a 
cell phone with a London number. I had a website created for The 
Maldon Group – just a home page with contact information – and 
an email account for myself. Then, in mid-February, soon after 
Berdymukhamedov’s ascent, I began contacting various lobbying 
firms by email, introducing my firm and explaining that we were 
eager to improve relations between the “newly-elected 
government of Turkmenistan” and the United States. We required 
the services of a firm, I said, that could quickly enact a “strategic 
communications” plan to help us. I hoped that the firms might be 
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willing to meet with me at the end of the month, during a trip I 
had planned to Washington.119 
 
The fiction worked like a charm, and Silverstein set meetings with 
two powerful D.C. lobbying firms.  As he described it in a later opinion 
essay, what he found and reported was that: 
 
In exchange for fees of up to $1.5 million a year, they offered to 
send congressional delegations to Turkmenistan and write and 
plant opinion pieces in newspapers under the names of academics 
and think-tank experts they would recruit. They even offered to 
set up supposedly “independent” media events in Washington that 
would promote Turkmenistan (the agenda and speakers would 
actually be determined by the lobbyists). . . . All this, Cassidy and 
APCO promised, could be done quietly and unobtrusively, 
because the law that regulates foreign lobbyists is so flimsy that 
the firms would be required to reveal little information in their 
public disclosure forms.120 
 
Rather than being praised for exposing the underbelly of foreign 
nationals’ lobbying of the U.S. government, Silverstein was taken to task 
by, of course, the targets of his investigation, and by other journalists for 
engaging in unethical behavior.  As one of his most vocal critics, 
Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz, wrote:  “no matter how good 
the story, lying to get it raises as many questions about journalists as their 
subjects.”121  
Another important illustration of the value, but also the costs, of 
undercover journalism is the investigation of the grocery store chain, 
Food Lion, conducted by two reporters from the ABC News program 
Primetime Live.  The reporters used résumés with false identities, 
addresses, and references to gain employment with two different Food 
Lion stores.122  After they were hired, they used hidden video cameras to 
document and confirm what sources had initially reported to ABC News, 
which was that Food Lion’s food handling practices were highly 
unsanitary and probably illegal. 
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The broadcast included, for example, videotape that appeared to 
show Food Lion employees repackaging and redating fish that 
had passed the expiration date, grinding expired beef with fresh 
beef, and applying barbeque sauce to chicken past its expiration 
date in order to mask the smell and sell it as fresh in the gourmet 
food section. The program included statements by former Food 
Lion employees alleging even more serious mishandling of meat 
at Food Lion stores across several states.123  
 
Another more subtle example of a journalist using deception to 
uncover an important story is Tony Horwitz, a reporter for the Wall Street 
Journal.  Horwitz gained access to a chicken-processing plant by getting 
hired as an employee so that he could gather information for a story about 
the conditions of low wage workers.124  What Horwitz found was 
astonishing.  The workers, who were paid extremely poorly, were given 
little to no training, placed in hazardous work environments subject to 
minimal oversight by the plant, exposed to unsanitary conditions, and 
subject to suspension for unexcused trips to the bathroom.125  These 
conditions imposed great health risks on employees.  Indeed, the type of 
work that poultry plant workers engage in subjects them to four of the 
five highest risk factors for cumulative trauma: “rapid and repetitive 
motion, awkward postures, forceful motions, and no control over the pace 
of work.”126 
To gain access to the plant and personally observe the working 
conditions, Horwitz applied for a position with a plant in Mississippi.  
Unlike the reporters in the prior examples, Horwitz’s deception to gain 
access to the plant fell somewhere between an omission and an 
affirmative lie.  When he applied for employment, he used his real name 
and indicated that he had a university education, but stated that his current 
employer was “Dow Jones & Co.,” the parent company of his actual 
employer.127  Horwitz, then, without telling an affirmative mistruth, 
concealed his identity as a newspaper reporter.  Notably, however, in the 
early 1990s when this investigation took place, deception may not have 
even been necessary in order for Horowitz to gain access to the poultry 
plant.  The industry had unusually high turnover rates, and “poultry 
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companies [would] hire constantly, with few questions asked and no 
skills required.”128  As Horwitz reported, the plant manager barely 
glanced at his application before hiring him.129  For his work on this story 
as the centerpiece of a series about low wage workers, Horwitz was 
awarded the Pulitzer Prize.130   
One thing is not disputed about these or the multitude of other 
successful undercover investigations conducted by journalists.  There is 
no claim in any of the charges leveled against the journalists that anything 
they reported was untrue.  As the court in the Food Lion case clearly 
stated, “The truth of the PrimeTime Live broadcast was not an issue in the 
litigation.”131  Many other examples of similar investigations have been 
documented.132  To be sure, journalists and journalism scholars have long 
debated the ethics of using lies and deception in their reporting, but it is 
undisputed that some of these lies have led to exposure of a wide range 
of corruption, illegality, and other information that is indisputably of 
great public concern.  While some defend the use of deception, and even 
affirmative lies, as rooted in the history of investigative journalism and 
as an essential tool for uncovering the hidden truth, others argue that 
journalists lose credibility when they engage in deception, even if that 
leads them to uncover valuable information.133   
 
C.  Law Enforcement and Lies 
 
Another context in which lying is a predominant investigative tool is 
law enforcement.  As with journalism, there is a vigorous debate about 
the morality of such practices, but there is also a very long history of lying 
to suspects as part of criminal investigations.  The practice of deception 
has played a prominent role in some of the most important criminal 
prosecutions in U.S. history, including that of Jimmy Hoffa.134 And while 
the practice may attract scholarly and public criticism, courts are virtually 
unanimous in singing the praises of investigative deception.  As the Tenth 
Circuit recently explained in defending the use of police deception, “if 
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total honesty by the police were to be constitutionally required, most 
undercover work would be effectively thwarted.”135  Echoing similar 
sentiments, one commentator has observed, “As a society, we find living 
with the use of such deception disconcerting, yet we dare not abandon 
such techniques.”136 
It is accepted that law enforcement investigatory tactics oftentimes 
involve deception.  Most notably, government officials routinely lie or 
misrepresent their identities, as well as other factual information, in 
undercover criminal investigations, or “stings.”137  Typically, these 
operations involve government agents posing as criminals or other actors 
affiliated with criminal activity in order to investigate violations of law.  
Law enforcement agents go undercover to investigate crime, posing as 
drug dealers, prostitutes, terrorist sympathizers, and various other 
participants in criminal enterprises, to gather information that they would 
otherwise be unable to access.138 
Perhaps one of the most best known examples of a government sting 
is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Abscam” investigation.139  The 
name Abscam was derived from Abdul Enterprises, a fake company set 
up by the FBI to recover stolen art and securities.140  As the investigation 
developed, it extended beyond its initial goals to pursue charges of 
bribery of public officials.141  As with other investigative tactics, 
government stings can cross the line from investigation to entrapment,142 
but the effectiveness of legitimate undercover investigations is widely 
acknowledged.143 
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The Supreme Court has approved such deceptions under an 
“assumption of risk” theory.144  The idea is seductively simple – in talking 
to other persons, or inviting them into parts of your life one always 
assumes the risk that the person might turn out to be a reporter, a cop, or 
some other form of false friend.145  One is free to choose his friends and 
companions, and free to choose what to share with them, but if the trusted 
friend or colleague turns out not to have your best interest in mind, you 
can’t complaint that the deception caused your harm.  The deceiver’s 
morality can be debated, but the propriety of using the evidence to 
prevent public harm or crimes is beyond peradventure at this point.146   
 
D.  Civil Rights Testing and Lies 
 
A third area in which lying routinely and effectively has been used to 
expose the truth about matters of public concern is federal housing 
discrimination law.  The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”) prohibits 
various forms of race, sex, religion, and national origin discrimination in 
the sale or rental of housing.147  As with other violations of law, housing 
discrimination can be difficult to detect.  This is particularly true of racial 
steering, which is conduct through which persons discourage persons 
from pursuing housing opportunities on a discriminatory basis.  A person 
who represents to another person “because of race” or other protected 
category that “any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental 
when such dwelling is in fact so available”148 violates the FHA.  A critical 
method of identifying racial steering and enforcing the FHA has been the 
use of “testers” by both government officials and private civil rights 
organizations.  In the context of housing discrimination investigations, 
“‘testers’ are individuals who, without an intent to rent or purchase a 
home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of 
collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices.”149  So, for example, 
investigators will send a white tester and an African American tester to 
the same person to inquire about buying or renting a home.  If that person 
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informs the white tester that housing is available, but tells the African 
American tester that it is not, an FHA violation has occurred.150 
Simply put, testing necessarily involves lying.  Testers frequently 
provide false names, addresses, and other identifying data.151  The testers 
also provide manufactured information such as credit ratings and 
employment information to housing sellers or landlords that conveys that, 
other than their race, they are essentially indistinguishable.152  Moreover, 
of course, the testers are all intentionally lying about their desire to buy 
or rent the property in question.  Civil rights testing is based on social 
science methods that require control over every variable except race as a 
method of proving discrimination.153  This is especially useful under the 
FHA, which is violated by disparate treatment.154 
Fair housing testing has been approved by the Supreme Court, which 
has not only recognized such testing as an established practice, but held 
that groups who hire persons to do these undercover investigations enjoy 
Article III standing to bring FHA claims in federal court.155  Congress, 
too, has expressly embraced testing.156  It established the Fair Housing 
Initiatives Program (“FHIP”) as a temporary measure in 1987, and 
permanently in 1991.157  The FHIP authorizes the Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development to allocate funds to private non-profit housing 
enforcement organizations to investigate violations of the FHA through 
testing.158  The Secretary is required to establish guidelines for such 
testing activity to ensure that such activity produces “credible and 
objective evidence of discriminatory housing practices.”159  These 
guidelines place several limitations on who can be testers, but do not, and 
by definition could not, prohibit testers from engaging in deception and 
misrepresentation as part of their investigations.160 
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There is evidence that testing has been effective in identifying and 
rooting out housing discrimination.  In 1996, the Iowa Civil Rights 
Commission issued a report that testing as a result of FHIP grants resulted 
in the identification of 136 possible FHA violations and the filing of 41 
complaints.161  A 1988 Urban Institute conference produced several 
papers that identified the effectiveness of civil rights testing.  As stated 
in the executive summary, “[e]vidence of discrimination has come from 
several sources, including analysis of aggregate employment, housing, 
and other data sets. While the regression techniques employed in these 
analyses have much to offer, they fail to provide the clear, direct measures 
and narrative power offered by paired testing.”162  While testing, through 
intentional lies, originated in the context of fair housing, it is now used to 
investigate discrimination in other contexts, and has been expanded to 
include, among other things, disability discrimination investigations.163 
 
E.  Animal Rights Investigators, Lying, and Ag Gag Laws 
 
Following the path of muckrackers, investigative journalists, law 
enforcement officials, and civil rights testers, animal rights activists, 
scholars, and journalists in recent years have been conducting their own 
undercover investigations of the agricultural industry to expose unlawful 
and unethical mistreatment of animals.  And they have been 
extraordinarily effective. In a gripping account of the modern industrial 
production of meat, political scientist Timothy Pachirat published a book 
that provides a thorough account of his undercover investigation of a 
Nebraska slaughterhouse.164  The book, EVERY TWELVE SECONDS, 
provides an insider’s account of what it is like to work in a facility that 
kills one cow every twelve seconds, or 2,400 animals per day.165  
Likewise, award winning journalist Ted Connover did an undercover 
investigation in 2013, and wrote a graphic article in Harper’s titled The 
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Way of the Flesh.166  These are but two examples of a body of 
investigative work that is of considerable political import. 
  Perhaps no undercover investigations in the agricultural field this 
century, however, have been more powerful than those produced by 
animal welfare organizations.  In 2008, for example, the Humane Society 
of the United States released video footage from the Hallmark 
slaughterhouse in Chino, California that showed, workers “kicking cows, 
ramming them with the blades of a forklift, jabbing them in the eyes, 
applying painful electrical shocks and even torturing them with a hose 
and water in attempts to force sick or injured animals to walk to 
slaughter.”167  The footage was so powerful that it resulted in criminal 
charges against a slaughterhouse manager, the largest beef recall in U.S. 
history, a $500 million False Claims Act judgment,168 and state 
legislation mandating better treatment of injured animals.169   
It is hard to imagine a lie – the deceptions by the Humane Society 
investigator in obtaining and performing his job – that could have resulted 
in more positive or dramatic social and political consequences.170  To be 
sure not every journalistic or activist investigation of an agricultural 
facility has such striking or clearly traceable results.  But the numerous 
investigations over the past couple of decades are all playing an important 
role in informing the modern political debate about agricultural 
production.  These exposés have played a material role in shaping the 
debate about animals as food in the United States.  The investigations are 
one of the most effective tools in convincing persons to reduce or 
eliminate animal products from their diet.171  Likewise, industry 
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researchers have recently concluded the work of these investigative 
groups is emerging as the “primary source of information about livestock 
and poultry welfare, by consumers.”172  To the extent that the First 
Amendment is animated by the goals of facilitating democratic self-
governance and the broader search for truth, these activities clearly 
advance those objectives. 
Notably, as in other fields, there is no viable alternative to an 
undercover investigation.  Those who are transparent about their 
investigative objectives are likely to be subject to the same Potemkin 
village effect as Sinclair confronted in his times.173  Organized farm tours 
and carefully chaperoned visits will not produce the sort of images or 
information that has become the centerpiece of the American debate on 
farmed animal welfare.  The same barriers to investigation are likely to 
emerge in other areas of social interest.  For example, a consensual or 
scheduled tour of an abusive childcare facility will not likely reveal to the 
reporter any abuse or neglect.   
Just as Upton Sinclair’s work led to federal law reforms, recent 
investigations have led to food recalls, state laws, and criminal 
prosecutions.  In response to the prominence and efficacy of these 
investigations and their public exposure of the unsavory and sometimes 
unlawful practices of commercial agricultural operations, the agricultural 
industry has sought to enact laws that would make these investigations 
impossible.  These so-called Ag Gag laws make undercover 
investigations by journalists, researchers, or investigators illegal. 
Since 2012, more than 25 states have introduced Ag-Gag bills,174 and 
five such bills have been enacted into law.175  A critical feature of most 
of these laws is the criminalization of all access to agricultural sites based 
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criminalized by general trespass laws. Moreover, in 2002 the ALEC drafted Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act (“AETA”) was rushed through Congress without debate.  WILL POTTER, GREEN IS 
THE NEW RED: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNDER SIEGE, 170-73 (2011).  
The AETA bill made it a felony to: “Enter an animal or research facility to take pictures by 
photograph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal activities or defame 
the facility or its owner.”  Id. at 128. 
175  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2014); 
IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-21-50 
(2014); see also Sarah R. Haag, FDA Industry Guidance Targeting Antibiotics Used in Livestock 
Will Not Result in Judicious Use or Reduction in Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 26 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318 (2015); Sarah Evelynn, Does Ag-Gag Make You Gag?, BILL TRACK 50, 
http://www.billtrack50.com/blog/civil-rights/does-ag-gag-make-you-gag/. 
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on deception, misrepresentations, or false pretenses.176  The laws tend to 
target gaining employment for investigative purposes specifically, and all 
misrepresentations to gain access more generally.177  For example, Utah’s 
Ag Gag law criminalizes: “obtain[ing] access to an agricultural operation 
under false pretenses” or obtaining employment for purposes of obtaining 
recordings of sounds or images.178  The Idaho version makes it a crime to 
“enter[] an agricultural production facility by force, threat, 
misrepresentation or trespass;. . . [or] obtain[] employment with an 
agricultural production facility by force, threat, or misrepresentation with 
the intent to cause economic or other injury.”179 
These laws go beyond generally applicable trespass laws, and instead 
single out those who wish to gain access to agricultural facilities.  They 
also extend well beyond laws prohibiting fraud, invasions of privacy, or 
physical damage, insofar as the criminalized conduct need not produce 
any injury other than the exposure of illegal or otherwise abhorrent 
practices through an undercover recording or a written account of what 
was observed.  In other words, Ag Gag laws criminalize lies even when 
they do not directly cause any injury at all, but rather expose the practices 
or illegal acts of a massive, federally subsidized, politically active 
industry.  All Ag Gag laws authorize some forms of criminal punishment 
for violators, including prison time, fines, and restitution.180 
Moreover, the legislative purpose behind these laws is much less 
opaque than the typical criminal statute.  The legislative history, the effect 
of the laws, and the context,181 all evince a legislative desire to target 
                                                                                                     
176  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b).   
One state, Missouri, criminalizes the failure immediately report observed abuse.  This law makes 
long-term investigations that would show a pattern or practice of abuse and potentially implicate 
management criminal, and there are certainly constitutional concerns with these laws as well.  For 
present purpose, however, we set the Missouri statute to one side because it does not apply directly 
to lies.  MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (“Whenever any farm animal professional videotapes or 
otherwise makes a digital recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm animal subjected 
to abuse or neglect [...] such farm professional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital 
recording to a law enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the recording”). 
177  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a), (c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b), (c). 
178  Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112(2). 
179  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(a), (c).  Some laws establish a separate criminal offense for 
the actual conduct of making a non-consensual audio or video recording on the premises of an 
agricultural operation. § 18-7042(d).  The constitutional protections applicable to image and 
sound capture in non-public forum raise distinct questions that we will address in a subsequent 
article.  There are currently lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Utah and Idaho Ag 
Gag laws.  The authors disclose that they serve as plaintiffs’ counsel in both of these cases. 
180  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(3); IOWA CODE § 717A.3A; 903.1; MO. REV. STAT. § 
578.013(3); 558.011(1)(5); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-21-80; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(3)-(4); -3-
204(2)-(3). 
181  See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68, 267 n.16, n.17, 
268 n.18 (1977).  




animal rights activists and sympathetic journalists and subject their 
political speech to disfavored treatment.182  Illustrative are the comments 
from the executive director of the group that drafted the Idaho Ag Gag 
bill:  “This impacts our industry.  So, you have to look and say, you know, 
you don’t stand up on a soapbox and broadcast.”183    Similarly, an Idaho 
state representative spoke in favor of a recent Ag Gag law by explaining 
that “[b]y releasing the footage to the Internet, with petitions calling for 
a boycott of products of any company that bought meat or milk from 
Bettencourt Dairy, the organizations involved then crossed the ethical 
line for me.”184  The desire to shield an industry from public scrutiny of 





In short, deception has a long and storied, if controversial, role in 
American history.  “[O]ur most cherished image of the press is the 
fearless reporter who uncovers matters we would prefer not to see or think 
about.”185  And while there may be instances where deception used to 
facilitate access to private information goes too far towards violating the 
privacy of an individual, many undercover investigations seek 
information that cannot be fairly “consider[ed] private, [such as] [t]he 
restaurant critic who pretends to be a regular customer, the journalist who 
pretends to be a taxicab fare and records his interaction with the cab 
driver, the housing tester who pretends to need a dwelling and records his 
interaction with a realtor, or even the television producer who obtains a 
job at a food processing plant and records food-handling practices she 
observes.”186  As we explain in the remainder of the paper, when the 
information revealed through the use of deception relates to a matter of 
great political significance or public debate and the information revealed 
is not of an intimate personal nature, the deceptions used to gain such 
information enjoy a unique status under the First Amendment.  
 
 
                                                                                                     
182  See, e.g., Bollard, supra note 9, at 10965-66.  
183  Bob Naerebout, Executive Director of the Idaho Dairyman’s Association, Idaho Senate 
Ag Committee Transcripts, Feb. 20, 2014, p. 30, lns. 9-11 
184 Representative Donna Pence, Pence Legislative 2014 Update Week 7, Donna Pence 
Legislative Updates & News (Feb. 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K4BB-F9GS.     
185  Bell, supra note 136, at 837. 
186  Id. at 750. 
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IV.  SPEECH THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE OF 
INVESTIGATIVE DECEPTIONS 
 
Even after Alvarez, the Court has never explicitly distanced itself 
from the longstanding view that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or 
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”187  That is, it has 
never considered that false factual speech might in some contexts actually 
have either intrinsic or instrumental social value.  The Court has 
recognized the necessity of protecting lies under the First Amendment, 
but it has done so only when necessary a prophylactic protection to avoid 
chilling truthful speech.188  
This approach has considerable intuitive appeal.  Deliberate 
misrepresentations would seem to be completely at odds with advancing 
democratic self-governance or the broader “truth-seeking function of the 
marketplace of ideas” that are often cited as central objectives of the First 
Amendment.189   
In this Part, we offer a novel view of the intersection of the First 
Amendment and lying by arguing that contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, lies by journalists, law enforcement officers, other investigators, 
and political activists made for purposes of exposing illegality or other 
private conduct that involves matters of important public concern 
advance the First Amendment’s values.  Specifically, most contemporary 
free speech theory is predicated on instrumental justifications for 
constitutional protection of expression190  and lies of the sort we have 
discussed in the previous section – investigative deceptions – actually 
serve these values underlying the First Amendment.  Stated more directly, 
certain lies are of affirmative value to the three primary theoretical 
                                                                                                     
187  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976) (emphasis added).  See also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (explaining that such a view of 
false speech in prior cases arose in the context of defamation or fraud or some other “legally 
cognizable harm associated with a false statement”). 
188 As the Alvarez plurality explained:  “Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful 
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was 
used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power 
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.  The mere potential for the 
exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, 
thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”  United States v. Alvarez, 132 
S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012).   
189  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
190  Other scholars reject these instrumentalist theories of speech and argue instead that the 
freedom of expression can best be understood by focusing on the government’s reasons for 
regulation.  Larry Alexander argues that “[f]reedom of expression is implicated whenever an 
activity is suppressed or penalized for the purpose of preventing a message from being received.  
ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 9.  See also Koppelman, supra note 20, at 722. 




purposes of the First Amendment: democracy, truth-facilitation, and self-
fulfillment.  Such lies are a high value form of expression.   
 
A.  Investigative Deceptions Promote Democratic Self-Governance 
 
One of the dominant speech theories argues that speech must be 
protected to ensure the advancement of democratic self-government.191  
As one of its most prominent proponents has written, “The primary 
purpose of the First Amendment is . . . that all the citizens shall, so far as 
possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.”192  
Meaningful deliberation about such issues can only take place with free 
and open discourse.  More recently, Robert Post has observed that the 
democracy-based theory of speech requires protection of the process of 
forming public opinion193  On this view, the First Amendment ought to 
protect “those speech acts and media of communication that are socially 
regarded as necessary and proper means of participating in the formation 
of public opinion,” which he calls “public discourse.”194  “The function 
of public discourse,” he writes, “is to enable persons to experience the 
value of self-government.”195  
Both its strength and weakness as a First Amendment theory is the 
fact that self-governance is limited to protecting speech that is at least 
somewhat related to public affairs, either in the context of electoral 
politics or public policy debates.  While some types of speech are more 
difficult to defend on democracy grounds,196 investigative deceptions are 
almost always directly linked to the advancement of self-governance.  
After all, as we have described, some of the most famous and award 
winning journalism is predicated on an investigative deception that led to 
access to a commercial, governmental, or other non-intimate enterprise.  
As the previous discussion illustrates, deception and lies can sometimes 
effectively uncover criminal conduct, enhance transparency in 
government, expose race discrimination, and reveal animal abuse, among 
many other types of illegal conduct.197  These are all matters of public 
concern and increasing public scrutiny of them undoubtedly advances 
                                                                                                     
191  See sources cited infra notes 201-05. 
192  MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 19, at 88-89. 
193  Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011). 
194  Id.  
195  Id. 
196  See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
381, 385 (2015). 
197  See generally KROEGER, supra note 115. 
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democracy in meaningful ways.198  Investigative deceptions about 
journalistic motives or the like actually enhance public discourse and 
produce information that may play a role in shaping public opinion, and 
thus investigative deceptions seem well anchored in the promotion of 
self-governance. 
Accordingly, limits on such lies of access run afoul of the principle 
that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited and robust,”199 and, 
more generally, undermine the central concerns of the First Amendment.  
And this is no less true for investigative deceptions in the agricultural 
context, like the sort of misrepresentations criminalized by Ag Gag 
statutes.  Animal welfare has become an important national public policy 
issue. Investigations in this field regularly result in front page stories in 
major newspapers, televised investigative reports, and animal welfare 
bills introduced and debated at the federal, state, and local level.200  The 
impact of Ag Gag laws in criminalizing investigative deceptions is to 
obscure and shield from public sight matters that are indisputably of 
public concern because they directly inform the public discussion and the 
policy debate in this vital and increasingly important issue.201  Food 
safety, environmental, labor, and animal welfare issues that arise in a 
massively subsidized industry must fall near the top of any list of 
politically significant issues.202   
 
B.  Investigative Deceptions Promote the Broader Search for Truth 
 
Under another understanding, protection of speech from state 
interference is necessary to advance the search for “truth,” which is 
defined as broader than political truth, but extends to a more general 
                                                                                                     
198  As Dean Post has observed, “[t]he difficulty is that government control over factual truth 
is in tension with the value of democratic legitimation.”).  ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, 
EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 
119 n.10 (2012). 
199 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (recognizing a “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
open”) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
200  See, e.g., Michael Moss, In Quest for More Meat Profits, U.S. Lab Lets Animals Suffer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2015, at A1; Stephanie Strom & Sabrina Tavrnise, Animal Rights Group’s 
Video of Hens Raises Questions, but Not Just for Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2015, at B3.  
201  In his scholarship on lying, Wright makes a more indirect claim that lies advance 
democracy.  Wright, supra note 7, at 1143-44.  In his hypothetical scenarios, which involve lying 
to fugitive slave hunters or Nazi SS officers, he suggests that lying to protect those who are being 
searched for might promote, among other things, liberal democracy.  Id.  We take him to mean 
this in the sense that the lies in that context undermine the terror-driven reign of a totalitarian 
regime rather than, as we argue, the direct contribution to information crucial to public discourse. 
202  Sims, supra note 170, at 537. 




theory of social enlightenment.203  Importantly, the notion of truth under 
this theory emphasizes the truth of ideas, rather than factual truths.  A key 
notion here, and one that is often drawn upon in judicial decisions about 
speech, is that there is no such thing as a false idea, and that truth can 
ultimately only emerge through robust, open discourse in the so-called 
marketplace of ideas.204 
In the context of undercover agricultural investigations, even beyond 
the legal and public policy questions that are placed into issue when 
exposés of the agricultural industry are conducted, there are significant 
moral and philosophical questions relevant to the First Amendment 
search for truth that are also informed by this information.  To take but 
one easy example, while some might believe that agricultural animals are 
merely unfeeling, unthinking forms of property, like tractors or barns, 
many others believe that any use or exploitation of animals for human 
gain is immoral.205   
While there is certainly an overlap between this moral discourse and 
the public policy debates on related issues, the point is that the search for 
truth in the sense of social enlightenment is also advanced by the 
information produced by investigative deceptions.  Again, to take 
agricultural investigations as an example since this industry is seeking 
special protection from investigative deceptions, in this context such lies 
serve to expose the hidden conduct of commercial agricultural operations.  
These revelations will impact the public’s thinking about the morality of 
modern agricultural practices – the investigator cannot control the 
message that his videos convey, but one can be sure that they are shaping 
public opinion.206  Thus, under the truth serving theories of the First 
Amendment, investigative deceptions may be powerfully justified.207  
Moreover, lies may even lead to a greater ability for society to 
deliberate about actual truth over the long run.  As Wright observes: 
 
Unquestionably, to lie to anyone, including an 
interrogating slave hunter or Nazi officer is, ordinarily, to 
                                                                                                     
203 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 4 (1644); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82-83 (2d ed. 
1859).  See also Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a 
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 596-98 (2011). 
204  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
205  See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS AS PERSONS: ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITION OF 
ANIMAL EXPLOITATION 3-21 (2008); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE 
CLASSIC OF THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT 94 (First Harper Perennial ed. 2009). 
206  About Us, ASPCA (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.aspca.org/about-us/press-releases/aspca-
research-shows-americans-overwhelmingly-support-investigations-expose. 
207  We distinguish this argument from claims that lies may be morally necessary not because 
they lead to truth, but because they advance morality at either the individual or societal level.  See, 
e.g., Wright, supra note 7, at 1143-44; Varat, supra note 7, at 1122. 
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fail to further the interrogator's true understanding of 
where his innocent quarry may be found. But on the other 
hand, such a lie (at least where successful), may over time 
promote the moral truths of the real consequences of 
slavery–ethnic and religious extermination, and genocide. 
Also to be factored in are such truths that the liar, the liar's 
family, and the sheltered slaves or Jews might later have 
discovered and perhaps shared. To obstruct the social 
systems of chattel slavery or Nazism, insofar as either 
amounts distinctively to a truth-suppressive institution, 
furthers the promotion of the truth.208 
 
One might argue, in the context of either the democracy or the truth-
seeking theory, that investigative deceptions do not have intrinsic value, 
but rather have instrumental value.209  That is, investigative deceptions do 
not directly contribute to discourse, but are a tool to gather information 
that informs that discourse.  The lie itself, so the argument would go, is 
not serving any truth or democracy enhancing purposes.  It is certainly 
true that the lies like, “I hate PETA and I am not affiliated with any animal 
rights organization” or “I love eating bacon and I have no problem with 
killing animals” do not directly contribute to a debate of public 
importance in the same manner as, for example, “Meat is murder,”210 
might.  However, the courts have protected other types of speech and 
even conduct that is not itself expressive, but is nonetheless preparatory 
to speech.  As the Court observed in Citizens United v. FEC,211 “laws 
enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in 
the speech process.” Indeed, the Court’s campaign finance cases are all 
to some degree predicated on the notion that restrictions on fundraising 
and spending are limited by the First Amendment because they facilitate 
subsequent political speech.212  Thus, the distinction between intrinsic 
                                                                                                     
208  Wright, supra note 7, at 1157-58. 
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211  558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
212  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money 
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exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”).  For the same reason, Ag Gag laws that 
directly restrict nonconsensual investigative video recordings also implicate First Amendment 
speech concerns.  See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2014 WL 
4388158, at *10 (D. Idaho Sep. 4, 2014); see also ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding that the “act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included 
within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to 
disseminate the resulting recording.”).  We will discuss this in greater detail in a future article. 




and instrumental value of investigative deceptions is not material to our 
basic claim because lies either directly or instrumentally serve truth.    
 
C.  Investigative Deceptions Promote Individual Autonomy 
 
The third widely cited First Amendment theory argues that the 
function of free speech is to promote individual autonomy or self-
realization. The autonomy theory focuses not on the value of speech to 
the broader society, but on its enhancement of the speaker’s liberty.  
Thomas Scanlon defined autonomy as necessitating the protection of an 
individual’s freedom to engage in self-determination in forming his or 
her own opinions and beliefs.213 
While autonomy arguments are probably the least weighty 
justification for First Amendment coverage of investigative deceptions, 
even here a case can be made.  There is an extent to which laws barring 
investigative deceptions, such as Ag Gag laws, interfere with the 
autonomous choices of journalists, government agents, and activists to 
choose how to identify themselves in the context of an undercover 
investigation.  Autonomy arguments have tended to focus on the freedom 
of the speaker to determine his or her own feelings, beliefs, and thoughts 
without government interference rather than on the liberty to frame 
(truthfully or falsely) one’s identity.  In that sense, lying does not 
obviously serve the goal of autonomy.  Still, there are arguments that 
might focus us more on the way that lies may promote the autonomy of 
self-identity, whether it be for the purpose of individual self-esteem (“I 
am the best law professor in the world”), to gain respect from others (“I 
volunteer at the soup kitchen every week”), or to gain access to an area 
where one believes illegal conduct may be occurring (“I am not affiliated 
with any journalists and I am excited to do this work”). 
David Han has suggested that what he calls individual “self-
definition” is an important aspect of autonomy that ought to be 
recognized under First Amendment doctrine.214  Thus, sometimes 
autobiographical lies may be a form of speech that may be protected as a 
means of promoting individual autonomy.  As he observes, “Under any 
basic conception of autonomy, however, a fundamental component of 
                                                                                                     
213  Scanlon, Theory, supra note 21, at 215.  In later work, Scanlon modified his views about 
speech and autonomy.  T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 
40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979).  Other autonomy theorists took a slightly broader view that 
included the protection of the individual’s ability to develop his or her powers and abilities and to 
control his or her own destiny through the autonomy of decision making.  Martin H. Redish, The 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). 
214  David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-
Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 92 (2012). 
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being an autonomous individual is exercising control over who you are-
and who you are is, to a significant extent, a function of who you define 
yourself to be to others.”215  Han’s theory resonates, to some degree, with 
the Court’s decision in Alvarez.216  Xavier Alvarez provided a 
biographical summary of his career after being elected to a local political 
position and he claimed to have served in the military and to have won 
the Medal of Honor.217  None of this was true, but the Court held that 
such lies – seemingly of minimal truth and governance value – were 
protected speech (though neither the majority nor the concurring opinion 
justified the invalidation of the Stolen Valor Act on autonomy grounds). 
Consistent with this view, R. George Wright has suggested that lying 
might be better examined as part of a broader moral context, in which lies 
might advance personal autonomy and liberty in ways that supersede their 
moral costs.218  Analyzing lies in the historical context of an imagined lie 
to a fugitive slave hunter or Nazi officer seeking to find Jews during the 
Holocaust, Wright argues that lies might have moral value in advancing 
the autonomy of the liar, and those she seeks to protect from harm.  “The 
lie may be instead motivated by a sense of the equal or irreplaceable value 
and infinite dignity of persons, or even by genuine concern for the 
questioner’s moral or spiritual well-being.”219  At least in the context of 
Ag Gag laws, the same moral claim could be made for activists seeking 
to promote the dignity and autonomy of non-human animals, a central 
tenet of many animal rights groups.220 
Balanced against these arguments is the countervailing loss of 
autonomy potentially experienced by the listener.  This argument is often 
used to explain why lies ought not to be protected under the First 
Amendment.221  Derived from the writings of Immanuel Kant and other 
moral philosophers, this claim suggests that lies are morally problematic 
because they deprive the listener of the very same autonomy that free 
speech is designed to promote.  Kant was something of a truth 
“absolutist” in that he rejected an instrumental theory under which lies 
could ever be understood in context as socially valuable.  As David 
Strauss has written: 
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[The] Kantian account gives relatively clear content to the 
notion that lying is wrong because it violates human 
autonomy. Lying forces the victim to pursue the speaker's 
objectives instead of the victim's own objectives. If the 
capacity to decide upon a plan of life and to determine 
one's own objectives is integral to human nature, lies that 
are designed to manipulate people are a uniquely severe 
offense against human autonomy.222  
 
A couple of factors might mitigate the concern over listener autonomy 
in the context of investigative deceptions, including the Ag Gag laws.  
First, the agricultural employee who is lied to and allows access to a 
commercial facility or record is unlikely to be directly harmed by the lie 
in any material way.  That is, to the extent that her autonomy is lost by 
being persuaded to permit an undercover investigator to enter an 
agricultural facility, it is not a personal loss, as it would be if her 
individual privacy were somehow compromised by the exchange.  Lies 
that facilitate access to intimate, personal details may very well work too 
much harm to the listener’s autonomy to be tolerated by the autonomy 
theory.  One could argue that the business’s autonomy is harmed by the 
lie insofar as it has lost complete control over its property.  But it is not 
clear that a conception of autonomy grounded in a right to be free from 
whistleblowers and exposés ought to be taken seriously, and as long as 
there are still limits on collecting obviously protected information such 
as trade secrets or tax records, the harm of that autonomy loss is minimal 
or non-existent.223 Moreover, there is an “unclean hands” argument that 
where unsavory or illegal conduct is occurring and the business’s  
employees are arguably complicit (or vicariously responsible), the loss of 
listener autonomy that occurs when an investigator lies to gain access to 
the property is at least less of a concern than it would be in other 
contexts.224 
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V. DOCTRINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION OF HIGH VALUE LIES 
 
The previous section sought to demonstrate that, properly understood, 
investigative deceptions are a type of speech that is covered by the First 
Amendment.  The remaining task is to describe how current doctrine 
would apply to laws that regulate or prohibit such lies, including Ag Gag 
statutes.  In the following sections, we offer a thorough discussion of the 
appropriate level of scrutiny and identify the key limiting principles 
applicable to First Amendment protections for high value lies.  
 
A. Considering and Applying the Proper Level of Scrutiny for Laws 
Criminalizing Investigative Deceptions  
 
1.  Strict Scrutiny  
 
a. Reading the Alvarez Plurality Tea Leaves 
 
 Alvarez is the lone Supreme Court decision to directly address the 
First Amendment protection owed to lies.  Because it is a fractured 
plurality opinion, the status of lies under the Constitution remains 
somewhat obscured.  Six justices clearly held that some lies – even 
intentional, self-promoting lies – constitute protected speech.225  
Likewise, six Justices recognize that only lies that cause material harm to 
the listener fall outside of the First Amendment as unprotected speech.226  
The First Amendment extends beyond truth.  The question of whether the 
Constitution requires strict or merely heightened scrutiny of government 
regulation of lies is much more opaque. 
 Because Alvarez includes no majority consensus on whether strict 
scrutiny applies, lower courts must toil through the impenetrable rule 
from Marks v. United States,227  which instructed that non-majority 
                                                                                                     
Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 2-11, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 
3693418, at *2-*11.  Their rationale for this argument, however, is based primarily on a concern 
that allowing some protection for intentional lies might undermine the coherence of First 
Amendment doctrine and also lead to precedents that would dilute the strict scrutiny standard 
because courts would be inclined to uphold many government regulations of false statements of 
fact. Id. at 2. 
225  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544-45 (2012). 
226  Id. at 2545. 
227  430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 




opinions will generally create precedent.  Under the Marks rule, “[w]hen 
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the 
judgment on the narrowest grounds.”228  Of course when it comes to 
judicial reasoning the term “narrow” is rarely illuminating.   For example, 
when the fundamental difference between the opinions concurring in the 
result is a core doctrinal disagreement, such as determining the applicable 
level of scrutiny, it may very well be that the Marks rule does not provide 
a single clear holding on that question.229  The difference between 
intermediate and strict scrutiny is one of kind not of breadth, and so it is 
simply not the case that one opinion is necessarily narrower than the 
other.230 Marks’s narrowest grounds rule cannot and does not stand for 
the view that when the Court is fractured, the holding constitutes the 
opinion that articulates the most parsimonious view of constitutional 
rights. 
 Accordingly, while Alvarez reflects a clear majority rejecting the 
notion that lies are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment, it 
may not squarely answer the question of the degree of scrutiny that 
applies.231    Notably, a prior study of the Court’s own use of the Marks 
rule suggests that when, as with Alvarez, there is no true common 
denominator of reasoning, no true narrowest grounds, the Court tends to 
defer to the lower courts in how to define the precedent from a prior 
Supreme Court plurality.232 Under this view, the precedential value of a 
plurality may be upward flowing from lower courts to the Supreme 
Court.233   Notably, a number of lower courts have held that strict scrutiny 
is the proper level of scrutiny for government actions prohibiting lies.234   
                                                                                                     
228  Id. 
229  Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic 
Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 994 (2013) (explaining the Marks rule’s proper application).   
230  See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that a plurality holding is “the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices 
would have assented if forced to choose”); Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(recognizing that, in the absence of a true commonality of reasoning, there is no binding holding 
from the Supreme Court). 
231  Id.   
232  Marceau, supra note 229, at 994.   
233  Id. 
234  See, e.g., American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority, 2014 WL 6676517 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (recognizing that when the lies at 
issue are “political expression” the speech is “entitled to even greater First Amendment protection 
than the speech at issue in Alvarez”); O'Neill v. Crawford, 970 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio 2012) (“The 
Alvarez court recognized that not only must the restriction meet the “compelling interest test,” but 
the restriction must be “actually necessary” to achieve its interest.”); State ex rel. Loughry v. 
Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 517 (2012) (quoting the plurality opinion from Alvarez for the view that 
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b.  Restrictions on High Value Lies Warrant Strict Scrutiny 
 
 The first two-thirds of this Article painstakingly develops the claim 
that not all lies are equal and that lies told in order to gain access to non-
intimate information of considerable public concern ought to be 
recognized as distinct from all other lies.  These investigative deceptions 
– misrepresentations that made the work of Upton Sinclair and his 
modern day heirs possible – should receive the utmost constitutional 
protection.  Insofar as investigative deceptions facilitate the underlying 
goals of truth and self-governance undergirding the freedom of speech, 
such lies deserve correspondingly more protection than lies which are 
protected only because the failure to do so might chill otherwise protected 
speech.  That is to say, the protection of intrinsically valuable lies surely 
must take priority over the protection of lies that are of no value.235  
Accordingly, whether Alvarez prescribes strict scrutiny for all lies is of 
no moment when assessing whether high value lies are deserving of strict 
scrutiny. 
 In a decision addressing the constitutionality of a law that 
criminalized lies told about ballot initiatives, the Eighth Circuit held that 
because the law in question regulated politically salient speech on the 
basis of its content, it must be subject to strict scrutiny.236  Analogous 
reasoning compels the conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to 
investigative deceptions, like those criminalized by Ag Gag statutes.  In 
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, the only reported decision in a 
challenge to an Ag Gag law, Judge Winmill denied a motion to dismiss 
by explaining, in relevant part, that laws criminalizing lies are content-
based and warrant strict scrutiny.237  This reasoning is unassailable.  
                                                                                                     
“[W]hen the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the least 
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.”); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint 
Against O'Toole, 141 Ohio St. 3d 355, 363 (2014) (assuming the application of strict scrutiny and 
observing “Alvarez does not consider whether the state can ever have a compelling interest in 
restricting false speech solely on the basis that it is false so that such prohibition could withstand 
strict scrutiny.”). 
235  See Norton, supra note 7, at 163 (arguing that “[t]he very ubiquity and diversity of lies 
thus supports a presumption that lies are fully protected by the First Amendment and that 
government therefore generally may not regulate them unless it satisfies strict scrutiny.”). 
236 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011) (summarizing 
Supreme Court doctrine and recognizing that speech limits – even if indirect, such as limits on 
tort verdicts – that limit speech “about matters of public concern” are subject to the highest 
scrutiny) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)); id. at 636 (“We do not, of 
course, hold today that a state may never regulate false speech in this context. Rather, we hold 
that it may only do so when it satisfies the First Amendment test required for content-based speech 
restrictions: that any regulation be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.”). 
237 ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (D. Idaho Sep. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 4388158. 




Whatever level of constitutional protection is ultimately deemed 
appropriate for lies like those at issue in Alvarez – lies described as 
nothing more than a “pathetic attempt to gain respect”238 – investigative 
deceptions that tend to facilitate truth and democratic debate ought to 
receive the highest level of protection.   
 
 c.  Strict Scrutiny Under Standard First Amendment Doctrine 
 
Even setting aside for a moment Alvarez and other lie-specific case 
law, it would be “puzzling”239 to conclude that laws banning investigative 
deceptions would not receive strict scrutiny.  Any law that is content 
discriminatory is subject to the most exacting standard of review,240 
which requires that the government show that the law in question is the 
least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest.241 
Taking Ag Gag laws as an example, laws that criminalize 
investigative deceptions are indisputably content-based.  Outlawing only 
parodies or jokes but not other types of expression would surely 
constitute a content-based limitation.242  Similarly, distinguishing 
between serious political speech and comical speech is not permitted.  For 
the law to distinguish between truthful and untrue speech is to favor one 
form of content over another.  If false statements are categorically exempt 
from the reach of the First Amendment, then perhaps the content 
discrimination in this context would not matter.  But if we have 
successfully made the case that investigative deceptions are not exempt 
from constitutional scrutiny, then Ag Gag laws and their ilk are content 
based on this reasoning alone.   
Moreover, Ag Gag laws are twice content-based.  In addition to 
discriminating between truthful and false speech, these laws discriminate 
based on the content of speech because they specifically apply only to 
statements made in the context of gaining access to agricultural facilities.  
The reason the Court imposes heightened scrutiny on viewpoint and 
content discriminatory laws is that such laws raise serious concerns that 
the government is using its power to control and distort public 
                                                                                                     
238  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).  
239  Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 5, 
2012 1:57 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_first_amendment_and_the_right_to_lie/ 
(summarizing Alvarez concurrence suggesting intermediate scrutiny).   
240  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994). 
241  Id. at 668.  See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
242  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680. 
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discourse.243  State action that protects agricultural facilities, but not other 
private business enterprises suggests that the government wishes to skew 
the debate about agricultural practices by steering public scrutiny away 
from this particular range of topics.  A generally applicable law 
prohibiting all investigative deceptions would present a more challenging 
constitutional question.244  But the Ag Gag laws criminalize only 
deceptions used to gain access and report on a single, massive and 
publicly important industry – indeed, in the rural states where these laws 
are most common agriculture may be the largest employer in the state.245   
These same legislatures have not prohibited misrepresentations made to 
gain access to child care facilities, large banks, workplaces where labor 
law violations may be occurring, or companies that dispose of toxic waste 
material, just to name a few examples of other regulated businesses where 
undercover investigations have occurred.    
Ag Gag laws single out the agricultural industry for protection against 
misrepresentations.  Both the distinction between truth and falsity, and 
the effort to safeguard a single industry from the likes of investigative 
reporters, thereby driving certain information from the marketplace of 
public discourse, are independently sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny for 
Ag Gag laws.  
That is not to say that investigative deceptions can never be 
criminalized.  A journalist’s efforts to expose national security matters or 
trade secrets may well constitute the sort of lie for which strict scrutiny is 
satisfied.246   A trickier question would be the use of deception to gain 
                                                                                                     
243 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116 (1991) (stating that content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”). 
244 Generally applicable laws that have only an incidental effect on speech activities are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).  
Accordingly, traffic laws and the like are common examples of laws that, though they may impede 
a journalists efforts to gather a story, are not unconstitutional.  By contrast, laws that criminalize 
the very means of gathering a story (misrepresentation) and do so in a manner that distinguishes 
among the type of targets for investigations can hardly be considered generally applicable laws.   
245  See, e.g., Sean Ellis, Ag industry gives Idaho’s economy a boost, Idaho State Journal (Jan. 
9, 2011), http://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/ag-industry-gives-idaho-s-economy-a-
boost/article_38912470-1c85-11e0-b19a-001cc4c002e0.html; Di Lewis, Agriculture a Growing 
Contributor to Utah Economy, Utah Business (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.utahbusiness.com/articles/view/agriculture_a_growing_contributor_to_utah_econo
my; Charles O’Brien, Agriculture sector continues to grow in the Iowa economy, 
IOWASTATEDAILY.COM (Mar. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_61e433f0-89af-11e2-9ada-0019bb2963f4.html. 
246 Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (2014) (“Privacy 
regulations are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. . . . Although the First Amendment creates 
a barrier to the enforcement of new and existing information laws, that barrier is not 
insurmountable. It simply requires, as it should, a lively inquiry into whether the harms caused by 




access to a facility or process by someone who does not know that trade 
secrets or other interests would be exposed or injured.  Assuming trade 
secret laws and other privacy protections of this sort in the commercial 
context can withstand constitutional scrutiny,247 we think that the proper 
standard in assessing liability under the laws in such circumstances would 
be the public figure defamation standard.248  That is, if the person is 
malicious or reckless in revealing or benefitting from such protectable 
interests, then the lies told to gain access and the publication of such 
information can be criminalized.  In this way, persons who lie with the 
intent of exposing a competitor’s trade secrets or to cause physical injury 
to the facility can be criminalized without risking First Amendment 
injury.  By contrast, most lies that result in the exposure of unsavory or 
illegal industry practices but do not compromise intellectual property or 
trade secrets, will be protected insofar as they are not made with the intent 
or reckless disregard of the risk of exposing trade secrets or similarly 
protectable interests.249  Upton Sinclair may have gained access to things 
that the slaughterhouse owner wished he had not seen, but he did not 
expose (nor did he intend to expose) any properly protected intellectual 
property.    
 
 d.  Strict Scrutiny under R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 
 
An alternative doctrinal approach to examining the constitutionality 
of Ag Gag laws and other prohibitions on investigative deceptions would 
not even necessitate the analytically prior conclusion that investigative 
deceptions are speech covered by the First Amendment.  In R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, the Supreme Court held that laws regulating even unprotected 
speech must be subjected to strict scrutiny if they discriminate within that 
category of unprotected speech on the basis of content.250  After he 
allegedly burned a cross on the property of an African American family, 
the defendant was charged under a city ordinance that prohibited the 
display of a symbol which the defendant has reason to know “arouses 
                                                                                                     
the collection of information are probable enough, and serious enough, to outweigh the right to 
learn things.”). 
247  Id.   
248  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
249  To the extent that trade secret liability is defined too broadly or generically, these laws 
would themselves fail First Amendment scrutiny.  And if deception is used to access a facility 
that contains trade secrets or the like, then certainly the investigator or reporter can take 
precautions to avoid revealing any of these protected secrets, just as any other employee would 
do.  And a failure to take such precautions might justify liability under a statute punishing reckless 
disclosures of such information.   
250  505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992). 
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anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender.”251  The state courts that had interpreted the ordinance 
had narrowed its construction to cover only conduct that was itself 
unprotected speech in the form of fighting words as defined by the 
Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.252 
Notwithstanding the assumption that the ordinance only prohibited 
fighting words, the Court held that the ordinance was facially 
unconstitutional because “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely 
on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”253  As explained by 
Justice Scalia, 
 
What [the cases announcing categories of unprotected 
speech] mean is that these areas of speech can, 
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated 
because of their constitutionally proscribable content 
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories 
of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that 
they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination 
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.254  
 
The Court elaborated further by drawing on the example of unprotected 
defamation.  “[T]he government may proscribe libel,” it said, “but it may 
not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel 
critical of the government.”255  By similar reasoning, even if the 
government could criminalize lying in general (or lying to gain access 
more specifically), criminalizing lies to gain access and expose only a 
single industry must be subject to strict scrutiny. 
 The regulation of lies by Ag Gag laws and similar statutes 
discriminates based on the type of facility sought to be accessed, and in 
some instances based on whether the individual intends to help or hurt 
the industry.256  Thus even if investigative deceptions might be generally 
proscribable, the law serves to effect a content-based discrimination 
“unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”257   
 To make this point more concrete, consider that the Alvarez plurality 
in dicta suggests that not all lies will constitute protected speech.  In 
                                                                                                     
251  Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
252  Id. at 381. 
253  Id. 
254  Id. at 383-84 (emphasis in original). 
255  Id. at 384.    
256  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(d) (criminalizing lies used to gain employment 
but only if the individual intends to cause (economic) harm to the agricultural industry). 
257  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84. 




particular both the plurality and the concurring opinion single out lies that 
harm another party, such as fraudulently obtaining employment for which 
one is not qualified, as an example of the type of lie that can be 
proscribed.258  As the plurality explains, “[w]here false claims are made 
to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say 
offers of employment,” the First Amendment generally provides no 
protection.”259  On its face this passage seems to provide support for the 
view that laws criminalizing misrepresentations to gain employment are 
not protected by the First Amendment.260  But when the prohibition is 
industry specific (or motivated by speech suppressing impulses261), strict 
scrutiny is required.   
 The crux of R.A.V.’s analysis is that while the government may 
suppress certain categories of speech because of the harms that are 
uniquely associated with their expression, it may not discriminate within 
those categories because of its hostility toward its non-proscribable 
content or viewpoint.  Just as it is permissible to criminalize all threats, 
but impermissible to criminalize only threats based on a particular 
viewpoint, so too it is flawed to assume that because (hypothetically) all 
lies to gain employment may be criminalized, lies to gain employment in 
one particular industry to expose misconduct can be criminalized. 
 Even if we were to concede that false statements of fact are a 
particularly worthless and harmful category of expression in the context 
of gaining employment or access, the state still would be constitutionally 
forbidden to criminalize lies in a selective manner reflecting its interest 
not in promoting truthfulness generally, but in inhibiting a lies in a 
particular realm of public discourse.262  As one leading First Amendment 
scholar has observed, “Singling out one or a small group of lies for 
                                                                                                     
258  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012). 
259  Id. 
260 Obviously, criminalizing lies to gain access unrelated to employment are unaffected by 
this dicta from Alvarez.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(a)-(c). 
261  See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 452 (1996) (recognizing that the core inquiry 
in assessing whether a law is content-based is ferreting out improper legislative motive).  See also 
Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper 
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 85-87 (2003). 
262 Although this type of discrimination differs slightly from content regulation about 
particular ideas, as in R.A.V., it is the conceptual parallel of that decision.  Ag Gag laws are not 
designed to address the distortion of truth in the same sense as, say, perjury laws, but are rather 
motivated by the government’s desire to prohibit revealing information about a particular topic –
the mistreatment of animals by commercial agriculture facilities.  And this is not just any run of 
the mill topic, but one that has been the subject of intense public discourse in recent years.  Such 
laws regulate lies not for the sake of regulating falsity, but to protect big agriculture from public 
scrutiny. 
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government condemnation, while leaving others unregulated, signifies a 
“realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”263 
 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny – High Value Lies as a Hybrid Speech 
Category 
 
Although we think it less plausible, we consider an additional 
possibility, which is that laws targeting investigative deceptions might be 
subject to intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny under First 
Amendment doctrine.264  Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Alvarez for 
himself and Justice Kagan suggests a preference for intermediate scrutiny 
as to the type of lie at issue in that case.265  As discussed above, 
investigative deceptions like those criminalized by Ag Gag statutes are 
materially distinguishable from the sort of lie at issue in Alvarez, which 
did not touch upon issues of public concern.  Thus, even if Breyer’s 
concurrence were viewed as the Alvarez holding on this question, it is 
unlikely that this opinion would be controlling in the context of high 
value, investigative deceptions.266  Nonetheless, even if intermediate 
scrutiny did apply, we think such laws are still vulnerable to invalidation. 
When a law is deemed content-neutral, the Supreme Court employs a 
formulation of intermediate scrutiny drawn from its cases evaluating the 
constitutionality of content neutral regulations of the time, place, or 
manner of expression in public forums.267  In these cases, the Court has 
                                                                                                     
263  Varat, supra note 7, at 1118 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)). 
264  See Norton, supra note 7, at 183 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard for evaluating government regulation of lies). 
265  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (“in this case, the Court's term 
‘intermediate scrutiny’ describes what I think we should do”). 
266  Other potential arguments for considering intermediate scrutiny would be that lies are a 
sui generis type of speech, like commercial speech.  See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  Likewise, laws of general applicability that govern 
conduct are typically afforded intermediate scrutiny.  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968). 
267  Another version of intermediate scrutiny had previously emerged in cases examining the 
constitutionality of government regulations of expressive conduct.  In those cases, the Court held 
that the regulation can only be upheld if “it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court has essentially acknowledged 
that time, place, or manner and speech/conduct tests are now the same standard.  See Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 
(1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984); see also 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the 
Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 167-70 (1995) (describing the Court’s 
merger of the time, place, or manner test with the speech/conduct test as the “Ward/O’Brien 
rule.”).  Moreover, it is “the Ward statement of the test has become the standard formulation.”  For 




said that such laws must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest,” and they must “leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”268  While this test is not 
as rigorous as strict scrutiny, it still imposes a substantial burden on the 
government in defending a law and is considered a form of heightened 
review.269  Indeed, the Court’s most recent invocation of intermediate 
scrutiny in McCullen v. Coakley is revealing.270  Not only did the Court 
strike down a Massachusetts law that criminalized the mere conduct of 
standing (even without speaking or picketing) within 35 feet of the 
entrance of an abortion clinic,271 it emphasized that laws that impinge 
speech for content-neutral reasons will face exacting scrutiny.  In 
particular, the Court explained that laws designed to avoid the problems 
associated with speech are strongly disfavored:   
 
Even though the Act is content neutral, it still must be 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest 
[and] [t]he tailoring requirement does not simply guard 
against an impermissible desire to censor. The government 
may attempt to suppress speech not only because it disagrees 
with the message being expressed, but also for mere 
convenience. Where certain speech is associated with 
particular problems, silencing the speech is sometimes the 
path of least resistance. But by demanding a close fit 
between ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents 
the government from too readily “sacrific[ing] speech for 
efficiency.”272 
 
Accordingly, the application of intermediate scrutiny to laws 
targeting investigative deceptions would require the state to articulate and 
defend its interests in criminalizing such lies by showing that the harm 
avoided is narrowly tailored to an important government interest.”  A 
general ban on all lies used for undercover access in an industry is surely 
too blunt a tool to survive such exacting scrutiny.   
Assuming, for example, the government interest were in preventing 
people from fraudulently obtaining employment and thereby performing 
                                                                                                     
a general discussion of the intermediate scrutiny test, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation 
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (“The Supreme Court tests 
the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions with an essentially open-ended form of 
balancing.”). 
268  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
269  Bhagwat, supra note 267, at 169. 
270  134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014). 
271  Id. at 2526. 
272  Id. at 2534.  
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jobs they are not qualified to perform, there is no material harm arising 
from such conduct if the undercover investigator is actually capable of 
performing the job tasks at hand.  Thus, the law could be more narrowly 
drawn to address misrepresentations that actually interfere with the 
employer’s ability to have its employees perform their assigned duties.  
In this way laws that prohibit lying about having a law license or similar 
professional training would likely survive First Amendment scrutiny.  A 
general ban on lies to gain employment (much less general bans on all 
misrepresentations to gain access, which encompass employment lies) 
would not survive strict scrutiny.   
Similarly, if the state’s interest is targeted at the illegal acquisition of 
confidential information, such as trade secrets, a law could be narrowly 
drawn to regulate that conduct in particular.  Indeed, many trade secret 
and intellectual property laws are likely constitutional for exactly this 
reason.  By contrast, laws that are written as broadly as the Ag Gag 
statutes manifest an intention not to address legitimate interests in 
property or fraud prevention, but to criminalize the conduct of undercover 
investigators in order to suppress their speech.   
Finally, intermediate scrutiny also typically requires that the law in 
question leave “open ample alternative channels” for the speech 
impinged by the law in question.273   For any industry, but particularly in 
the secretive agricultural industry, it is unlikely that any viable 
alternatives to undercover whistleblowing exist.  The lies are speech (or 
conduct) that facilitate the production of undercover videos showing the 
real time production of food.  Merely pointing to the ability to protest on 
the street or leaflet or hold rallies is no answer to the law’s ability to 
utterly foreclose access to investigative reporting in the agricultural 
industry.  There really is no ample alternative forum through which 
activists and journalists might carry out this type of expression, and thus 
even under intermediate scrutiny, these Ag Gag laws would be found to 
be an unconstitutional infringement of expression.274 
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274 Ag Gag laws and similar statutes criminalizing investigative deceptions are also 
vulnerable to claims that they are unconstitutionally overbroad.  The First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine requires that laws be invalidated when they restrict significantly more speech 
than the First Amendment allows.  Criminal statutes must be examined particularly carefully. 
Such laws are particularly dangerous from a First Amendment perspective because of their 
potential to chill important expression.  Overbreadth law protects individuals who “may well 
refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible 
of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).   Ag Gag 
laws typically criminalize a wide range of conduct, some of which is not protected by the First 
Amendment (such as using force to enter, obtain records from, or obtain employment with an 
agricultural production facility), but a substantial amount of which is protected expression under 
the First Amendment, such as using misrepresentations in further of an animal welfare 





 B. Limiting Principles – Cognizable Harm as a Precondition to 
Criminalizing Lies 
 
The previous discussion attempts to situate investigative deceptions 
within the Court’s tiers of scrutiny for the First Amendment and 
concludes that strict scrutiny most likely applies to laws criminalizing 
such lies.  But even if investigative deceptions are recognized as high 
value speech subject to strict scrutiny, it is important to note that the law 
would still leave the government ample room to regulate material 
misrepresentations that endanger identifiable and tangible privacy and 
property interests.  A critical piece of the doctrinal framework for 
understanding high value lies is developing a coherent set of limiting 
principles, which we attempt to do in this final section.   
The most significant limiting principle is easily stated: Lies that cause 
material third party harm fall outside the ambit of the First Amendment’s 
protection.275  Both the plurality and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Alvarez recognized this as limit on the protections afforded to lies by 
noting variously that the lie must not produce “legally cognizable 
harm”276 or be used to gain “material advantage”277; and that the lie must 
not have caused “actual injury”278 or “specific harm.”279  Under this view, 
the government may not criminalize lying “in contexts where harm is 
unlikely.”280  As we discuss in this section, it is, therefore, necessary to 
define with some specificity what constitutes a legally cognizable harm 
in the context of investigative deceptions.  Regulations of lies that cannot 
fairly be regarded as the legal cause of an injury are protected speech and 
subject to either strict or intermediate scrutiny, depending on the analysis 
above. 
                                                                                                     
investigation.  Because the laws often prohibit any type of misrepresentation used to gain access 
to an agricultural operation, they reach a wide range of expression, including, but not limited to, 
falsely asking to use a restroom to gain access to a property to failing to disclose one’s political 
affiliations.  As such, they sweep well beyond the scope of conduct that may be constitutionally 
regulated. Moreover, a law is more likely to be deemed overbroad if it is impinging speech of 
particular political salience.  Richard Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 
894 (1991). 
275  But see Norton, supra note 7, at 187-99 (dividing harms into “second-party” (i.e., listener) 
and “third-party” (i.e., broader social) harms.) 
276  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012). 
277  Id. at 2548. 
278  Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
279  Id. at 2556.  Id at 2255 (noting that “proof of injury” is a general requirement for 
outlawing lies). 
280  Id. at 2555. 
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As Professor Varat has observed, there are two main categories of 
potential interests that might limit First Amendment protection for lies 
designed to secure truthful information.  The first possible interest would 
be in protecting the listener from “psychological or pecuniary harm” that 
the investigative deception caused “directly and independently.”281  
Second, there is a potential indirect harm caused by “the subsequent 
publication of the accurate information obtained as the result of the lie.”282  
We address each of these categories in the following sections. 
 
 1.  Possible Direct Harms 
 
There are, of course, easy examples at both extremes of the spectrum 
of direct harms caused by lies.  Defamation causes financial and 
reputational harm and falls beyond the scope of First Amendment 
protection.283  The same is true of common law fraud, which has as an 
element actual injury.284  Likewise, crimes like perjury or lying to 
government officials impose materiality requirements, which typically 
require a showing of some likely injury or harm flowing from the lie,285 
and in any event lies that may cause our democratic system of governance 
to falter are always safely categorized as harm causing.  On the other end 
of the spectrum fall white lies and puffery.  Intentionally lying and telling 
a co-worker that he does good work, or that he always dress 
professionally, for example, is clearly protected speech.286   
It is not terribly difficult to fit laws barring investigative deceptions 
such as Ag Gag laws into this framework.  To the extent that Ag Gag 
laws impose criminal penalties on misrepresentations to gain access to 
agricultural operations, they do so without reference to any tangible harm 
caused by the misrepresentations themselves.  The laws criminalize the 
                                                                                                     
281  Varat, supra note 7, at 1122-23. 
282  Id. at 1123.  
283  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985). 
284  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545. 
285  Materiality in this context is often defined as lies which could have affected the outcome 
of a governmental proceeding.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-501(1) (2014 West) (“affected the 
course or outcome of an official proceeding, or the action or decision of a public servant, or the 
performance of a governmental function”).   More importantly, it is recognized that perjury 
undermines the credibility and legitimacy of our justice system, thus causing a grave social harm.  
See, e.g., Nicole Oelrich Tupman & Jason Tupman, No Lie About It, the Perjury Sentencing 
Guidelines Must Change, 59 S.D. L. REV. 50, 64 (2014); John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui 
Tam Action for Perjury in A Civil Proceeding Is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil 
Judicial System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 785 (2006) (“the judicial branch has a genuine interest in 
addressing the harm that perjured testimony causes to the civil judicial system.”). 
286 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (Kozinski, J., concurring in denial 
of rehearing en banc) (cataloguing a long list of such lies and identifying the lie as an essential 
feature of modern communication). 




access itself and any other harm that occurs during the course of the entry 
– whether it be the theft of property, destruction of property, or loss of 
trade secrets – is independent from and separately punishable under 
distinct criminal provisions. 
 
 a.  Trespass 
 
One likely basis for a legitimate assertion of harm to a protected 
interest would be the property right to possession.  One who enters 
through deception, so the argument goes, would be harming the exclusive 
possessory interests of agricultural operations owner in ways analogous 
to a trespass.287  Notably, however, it is axiomatic under common law 
that civil trespass complainants need not show actual damages as a 
precondition of liability.288  Liability for trespass will presumptively only 
result in the imposition of nominal damages, and any recovery of more 
than that requires a showing of actual damage.289 That is to say, even if 
one strains to categorize entry through deception as trespass, because 
trespass is understood generally as imposing liability without harm, there 
is no basis for understanding all such deceptions as beyond the realm of 
First Amendment protection.  Quite the contrary. 
There is generally no harm cognizable at law caused by entry gained 
through investigative deceptions.  As Judge Posner has vividly explained, 
entry into a business through deception where one wants or invites entry 
(but does not know the investigators true purpose) is not a true trespass 
because in such cases there is no invasion of the “the specific interests 
that the tort of trespass seeks to protect.”290  Needless to say, if an 
undercover investigator actually caused physical damage to property, 
personal injury, or some other tangible harm arising from an 
                                                                                                     
287  17 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE § 10.2 (2d ed.) (2014) (consent can be a defense to 
trespass, “provided it was not obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or duress. . . .”); Food Lion, 
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (M.D. N.C. 1996).  But see Laurent 
Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 877, 882 (2014) (suggesting that trespass 
advances privacy interests). 
288  JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 28 (3d ed. 2010). 
289 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE, §18-7008(A)(9) (establishing a misdemeanor for “Entering 
without permission of the owner or the owner’s agent, upon the real property of another person 
which” is posted with proper signage indicating that the property is private and may not be 
trespassed upon).  Interestingly, all other provisions of the Idaho criminal trespass statute entail 
actual tangible harm to the property.  Id. at §18-7008(A)(1)-(8), (10).In contrast it is common for 
statutory trespass actions to require actual damages.  While some state criminal trespass laws may 
be enforced even without a showing of actual harm, it is widely recognized that the sort of privacy 
and property rights protected by trespass laws are simply not served by punishing someone who 
gains access through deception. 
290  Id. 
56                       HIGH VALUE LIES [24-Mar-15 
 
investigation, she could be held criminally or civilly liable.  But the act 
of accessing a place through deception does not in and of itself cause a 
legally cognizable harm.291  The absence of any harm and the “inevitable 
effect” of the laws on investigative journalism and other speech activities 
doubtlessly implicates First Amendment protection.292   
  
  b.  Interference with Business Operations and Hiring Practices 
 
 Another interest that the state may legitimately protect is the 
agriculture enterprise’s ability to carry out its business lawfully.  Thus, 
any misrepresentation that leads to direct interference with business 
operations (as distinguished from the self-inflicted economic harm 
resulting from the exposure of unlawful treatment of animals) could be 
constitutionally punished.  Similarly, the state has a legitimate interest in 
helping businesses protect trade secrets and other secret proprietary 
information that allows them to fairly compete in the economic 
marketplace.293  Again, misrepresentations that are used to secure such 
information are within the state’s authority to regulate because the harm 
that is avoided is concrete.  But they are also clearly covered by more 
specific available legal remedies, and therefore these interests are 
satisfied by less restrictive alternatives than laws that ban investigative 
deceptions. 
There is another way of viewing the state’s interest in protecting 
business operations, and that is through the idea that investigative 
deceptions might interfere with a business’s hiring practices, as opposed 
to its general operations. As the Alvarez plurality emphasizes, the First 
Amendment does not protect fraudulent speech, which may include lies 
made in order to “secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say 
offers of employment.”294  As to lies by undercover investigators who seek 
employment, then, that might seem to be the end of the matter as a cursory 
reading of Alvarez would suggest that employment securing lies are 
beyond the First Amendment.  But the matter is not so simple.  Not all 
lies to gain employment are on equal footing.  The passages in Alvarez 
                                                                                                     
291  Lies to reveal intimate, private details may present different questions.   As Judge Posner 
has elaborated, “If a homeowner opens his door to a purported meter reader who is in fact nothing 
of the sort—just a busybody curious about the interior of the home—the homeowner's consent to 
his entry is not a defense to a suit for trespass.”  Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 
1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995) 
292 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968). 
293  Id. at 1352 (“if a competitor gained entry to a business firm's premises posing as a 
customer but in fact hoping to steal the firm's trade secrets,” that would be trespass) (citing 
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir.1991)). 
294 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012). 




regarding employment are dicta because the Court was not considering a 
lie used to get a job, much less the diversity of employment related lies, 
some of which are surely protected and some of which are just as clearly 
not.   
To put the issue of employment-based investigative deceptions in 
context, consider the lies told by Xavier Alvarez and their potential 
impact.  Alvarez’s lies about his military experience and honors were not 
the sort of generic puffery that would have struck many judges as 
protected speech; instead, they were the sort of lies that are designed to 
gain credibility or at least reputational benefits on the lying speaker.295  
Such lies, though perhaps not persuasive to many, were made, according 
to the Supreme Court, in order to “gain respect” from the public and his 
fellow board members.296  In other words, the lie was made intentionally, 
and with the purpose of securing undeserved respect in the community, 
something that is not trivial to politicians, even local politicians.  Yet 
because the lie did not cause any legally cognizable injury, six Justices 
agreed it was protected speech.297  If a politician’s lies about 
accomplishments, even military honors, are protected speech, then the 
range of lies that cause cognizable harm is relatively small and a vast 
range of mistruths is entitled to First Amendment protection.   
One particularly important category of lie that is unlikely to cause an 
injury sufficient to place it outside of the First Amendment’s protections 
is lies to gain access to an agricultural facility by investigators pretending 
to seek employment or other false pretense for entering the premises.  On 
the one hand, telling an employer that he has beautiful kids, or that you 
have always dreamed of working in a slaughterhouse, or even that you 
are a born again Christian, might very well impact one’s decision to hire 
you.  In that sense the lie is relevant, and maybe even material, to the 
employment decision. But such lies are not the sort of harm-causing, 
material lies that fall outside the First Amendment.  The harm that befalls 
an employer following such an employment decision, if any, is the harm 
of exposing non-defamatory information discovered during the 
employment to the public.298  Similarly, loyalty to a cause might make 
one a more desirable employee, but omissions or misrepresentations 
about political or ideological disagreement with the industry or employer 
                                                                                                     
295 Id. at 2542. 
296 Id.   
297 Id.  
298  Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (recognizing that both the “broadcast” and the “production of 
the broadcast” are protected by the First Amendment and noting that the target of an undercover 
exposé has no legal harm when the business secrets are revealed even if e target has no legal 
remedy even if the “investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational, 
unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly.”). 
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fall into the class of lies to which the First Amendment applies, because 
there is no harm as a matter of law.299  Simply failing to disclose an 
investigative purpose does not, without more, cause legally cognizable 
injury any more than failing to disclose a desire to unionize a 
workplace.300  
On the other hand, a wide range of employment related lies might 
easily be characterized as falling outside the reach of the First 
Amendment.  Lying about one’s qualifications for a job – claiming to 
have a law degree or training in the operation of heavy equipment, or 
other certificates or special skills – are quintessential examples of lies that 
typically do not enjoy First Amendment sanction.  These lies relate to the 
essential function or task of the job and can cause cognizable injury to 
employers by exposing them to liability risks as well as an unsafe or 
unqualified work force. Work that is done less safely or less productively 
is a cognizable injury and lies made to shield inexperience or lack of 
credentials may cause such injury.  Such fraudulent representations might 
lead to actual and direct harm to a business’s operations and perhaps to 
harm to third parties, as in the case of an employee who creates safety 
risks because she is not trained in the way she represented.301 But when 
the lie has no bearing on the requisite qualifications of the individual and 
no relationship to the ability of the individual to safely and effectively 
perform the work in question, the First Amendment clearly implicated.   
 Strikingly, even the wages paid to undercover investigators who take 
employment based on lies will not generally result in harm to the 
employer that is proximately caused by the lies so long as the employees 
perform all of their duties competently.  That is to say, a lie that enables 
a journalist to obtain paid employment and thus causes the employer to 
experience the most concrete and measurable harm – a financial expense 
– is not a legally cognizable harm.  As the leading circuit court decision 
on this point explains: 
                                                                                                     
299 Of course, answering this threshold question – the very question at issue in Alvarez – does 
the First Amendment apply at all, is not the end of the inquiry.  If a factual showing can be made 
that lies about loyalty, among other things, materially harm the employer, than the lie might still 
be criminalized because appropriately tailored legislation could satisfy strict scrutiny.  But these 
are generally factual questions – does the law satisfy the applicable scrutiny.  Our goal is to make 
clear that as a legal matter such scrutiny should be applied, and such a factual showing must be 
made. 
300  For example, “salting” is a common union practice whereby union organizers seeking to 
organize a particular employer’s workforce may apply for a job without disclosing their status as 
a salt or union organizer. See e.g., Harman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. NLRB, 280 
F.3D 1110, 1111 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The only purpose of criminalizing such a lie could be to 
discourage salting, an activity protected by the [National Labor Relations] Act.” 
301  Thus, where tangible harms result, the constitutional implications are different.  See 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (rejecting newspaper’s First Amendment 
defense to suit by confidential source who claimed the newspaper breached its promise to protect 
his identity from public disclosure resulting in the loss of his job). 





The question is what was the proximate cause of the 
issuance of paychecks to Dale and Barnett. Was it the 
resume misrepresentations or was it something else? It 
was something else. Dale and Barnett were paid because 
they showed up for work and performed their assigned 
tasks as Food Lion employees. Their performance was at 
a level suitable to their status as new, entry-level 
employees. Indeed, shortly before Dale quit, her 
supervisor said she would “make a good meat wrapper.” 
And, when Barnett quit, her supervisor recommended that 
she be rehired if she sought reemployment with Food Lion 
in the future. In sum, Dale and Barnett were not paid their 
wages because of misrepresentations on their job 
applications.302 
 
If a lie to gain employment does not cause a legal “injury” to the employer 
who pays the wages, then a wide range of injuries suffered by the 
employer (or accessed party) are also not caused by the lie.303  Certainly, 
the run of the mine lie about one’s interest in the field, an underselling of 
one’s credentials, a lie about political or ideological beliefs, or a lie about 
investigative motives does not cause such harm, and as such these lies 
fall within the First Amendment protections recognized in Alvarez.304 
                                                                                                     
302 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 1999); id. 
(holding that lost sales and profits were not caused by the undercover investigation but by the 
information disclosed by the publication of the investigation’s findings). 
303  Food Lion stands for the proposition that the harms occasioned by investigative reporting 
are “caused not by [the Reporter’s] conduct but by Food Lion's own labor and food handling 
practices.” Symposium, Panel I: Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 424 (1997).  
304 Of course, a wide range of injuries suffered by an employer can fairly be said to have 
been caused by a lie.  Criminalizing deceptive entry for the purpose of stealing intellectual 
property, clients or trade secrets is likely permissible.  Likewise, acts of terrorism or sabotage or 
the like committed by persons gaining access under false pretenses will always be the cause of 
injury to the victimized employer or citizen, and the lies that make such acts possible could be 
criminalized.  Perhaps even lies about one’s desire to remain employed for an extended period of 
time with the same employer could give rise to actual cognizable harm in certain instances. But 
even in the face of explicit lies about one’s desire to remain employed, it may be difficult to show 
that such a lie caused the damage in question.  See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 513 (“Because Dale 
and Barnett did not make any express representations about how long they would work, Food 
Lion is left to contend that misrepresentations in the employment applications led it to believe the 
two would work for some extended period. There is a fundamental problem with that contention, 
however. North and South Carolina are at-will employment states, and under the at-will doctrine 
it is unreasonable for either the employer or the employee to rely on any assumptions about the 
duration of employment. At-will employment means that (absent an express agreement) 
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 Finally, while employers might argue that investigations resulting 
from deceptive employment applications breach a common law duty of 
loyalty arising from the employment relationship, those duties have 
typically been limited to direct interference with the employer’s business 
operations, as where an employee directly competes with her employer, 
misappropriates property, profits, or business opportunities, or breaches 
confidences, such as revealing trade secrets.305   
 In short, lies about sexual orientation, love of sports, or marital status, 
no less than lies about fidelity to the employer’s cause, may impact the 
employment decision.  But these lies do not obviously cause any concrete 
injury to the employer.  As such, the lie should be viewed as speech (or 
conduct facilitating speech) and the regulation should be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny.306 
 
 c.  Privacy and Autonomy 
 
Finally, a law may legitimately protect reasonable expectations of 
individual privacy on commercial premises.  Speech is always entitled to 
more protection if it is of public concern, and thus investigative 
deceptions may serve to facilitate politically important speech on issues 
relating to how certain industries are operating.  But the importance of 
speech about an industry does not make everything that happens at the 
facility politically significant.  Thus, a law that forbade someone from 
gaining access to private information, such as individual income tax or 
health insurance records, or to areas of a commercial enterprise in which 
expectations of privacy are commonplace, such as workplace restrooms 
or employee locker/changing rooms, would advance valid personal 
privacy concerns.  The First Amendment provides less protection when 
the privacy implicated is of a personal nature, and this is no less true in 
the context of lies that are preparatory to an investigative entry.  Many 
lies to gain access will cause no cognizable harm and are thus protected 
by the First Amendment, but lies to gain access in ways that are harmful 
to personal dignity or to concrete business interests do not deserve 
constitutional sanction. 
                                                                                                     
employers are free to discharge employees at any time for any reason, and employees are free to 
quit.”). 
305  Food Lion, 194 F.3d, at 515-16. 
306 If a particular employer or industry can meet the burden of proof required for heightened 
scrutiny – some showing, for example, that a particular lie or class of lies will cause financial 
harm based on empirical data, then a law narrowly tailored to prevent that particular type of lie 
will likely survive constitutional scrutiny. 
 




Furthermore, independent of actual privacy concerns, is the 
previously discussed matter of the deprivation of listener autonomy.  We 
have already addressed that potential interest in our discussion about how 
high value lies advance the speaker’s autonomy.307  In addition, as Helen 
Norton has argued, the privileging of listeners’ over speakers’ autonomy 
“would empower the government to punish a wide swath of lies and thus 
frustrate an antipaternalistic understanding of the First Amendment.”308 
 
. 2.  Possible Indirect Harms Caused By Public Disclosure 
 
While it may be difficult to identify any direct harms from 
investigative deceptions, it is easy to recognize indirect harms to an 
employer exposed to an investigative reporting effort.  One such harm 
that cannot be denied in the realm of investigative deceptions is the 
reputational injury that flows from the publication of an exposé.  
Businesses universally seek to exclude undercover investigations because 
of the risk of backlash in the form of boycotts or bad publicity.  A critical 
source of the injury in cases of journalistic investigations is the 
publication and distribution of information or images obtained during the 
access that was gained by deception.  For instance, the harm that befalls 
a childcare facility exposed by an undercover employee investigation by 
Dateline NBC is the damage to its reputation when the public sees, for 
example, the abusive treatment of children.  The harm to a grocery store 
that is exposed for repackaging adulterated meat products by 
investigators is the exposure of its unsanitary practices.  Likewise, the 
harm to an agricultural facility from an undercover employment 
investigation is the public reaction to the food safety, animal welfare, and 
labor issues that are documented or reported by the investigator.    
These are serious harms.  And at an intuitive level they are “caused” 
by the deceptive entry into the business.  However these are not harms 
that can be criminalized.  The harm that flows from public disclosure and 
debate about non-defamatory material is a harm qualitatively different 
than any other harm to one’s property or privacy interests.309 When the 
harm sought to be avoided is the publication of truthful information of 
public concern, the First Amendment is uniquely implicated for at least 
two reasons.310   
                                                                                                     
307  See supra notes 221-224 and accompanying text. 
308  See Norton, supra note 7, at 190. 
309  Cf. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (“The publication damages Food Lion sought (or alleged) 
were for items relating to its reputation, such as loss of good will and lost sales”). 
310  See Susan M. Gilles, Food Lion as Reform or Revolution: "Publication Damages" and 
First Amendment Scrutiny, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 37, 60 (2000) (“It suggests a unifying 
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First, harms borne of publication on issues of public concern, and the 
concomitant public discourse that results, are harms that cannot fairly be 
traced to the lie that created the opportunity for the exposure.311  Of 
course, it is true that without publication there would be no reputational 
harm, but the First Amendment cannot tolerate a limitation on lies simply 
because they may lead to the publication of information that is otherwise 
unavailable, at least not when the information is non-intimate, non-
defamatory, and of great political importance.312  Just as the wages paid 
to the employees conducting undercover investigations are not caused by 
the lie but by the work that was completed, the harm of publication is not 
caused by the lie, but by the bad acts that the investigator recorded or 
documented.  The lie itself facilitates access, and if one does poor work 
or appears disloyal, or overly snoopy, he can be fired at will; the lie is 
instrumental to publication but is not the true cause of the harms of 
publication.313  As one commentator has summarized the law: 
 
                                                                                                     
constitutional principle for all actions against the media precisely because it treats the cause of 
action filed as irrelevant. First Amendment scrutiny is triggered if a plaintiff seeks damages based 
on publication.”). 
311  But see Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (“No interest 
protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion to be 
enhanced by the fact of later publication of the information that the publisher improperly 
acquired.”). A number of cases dating back to an era of very different and more robust 
expectations of privacy reach similar conclusions, extending the media's liability for 
newsgathering torts to damages arising from the ensuing publications.  Sims, supra note 170, at 
542 n.187 (1998) (compiling such cases).  These cases have been rightly and roundly criticized 
by the few commentators who have paid attention to them.  See, e.g., Jacqueline A. Egr, Closing 
the Back Door on Damages: Extending the Actual Malice Standard to Publication-Related 
Damages Resulting from Newsgathering Torts, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 693, 712-13 (2001) (“The 
Dietemann court erred in simply relying on the common law without incorporating First 
Amendment principles into its decision. Although Dietemann allegedly sought damages for 
invasion of privacy, the real harm, arguably, was his loss of reputation or esteem in the community 
resulting from the publication of the article and photographs disclosing his medical ‘quackery.’ 
Based on this theory, the court allowed Dietemann to recover damages coextensive with those 
awarded for a defamation claim without meeting the actual malice standard.”). 
312  A case that is frequently cited in defense of Ag Gag statutes is Houchins v. KQED, Inc,, 
which, through a fractured plurality, denied the press unlimited access to a prison facility.  438 
U.S. 1, 15 (1978).  Notably, however, the controlling concurrence in Houchins, Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence, explains that the First Amendment’s freedom of press is not a mere redundancy. Id. 
at 16.  If ever the Court should recognize a distinct freedom of press right, it should be in the 
context of lies to gain access, to non-intimate details of great political significance. 
313 The defamation related protections are designed to protect against allegations of injury 
arising from publication.  Some have argued that in newsgathering cases, the injury to the plaintiff 
occurs during the investigation and prior to publication, thus arguing that speech rights are less 
implicated by limits on investigations through generally applicable laws.  Sims, supra note 170, 
at 526.  In the Ag Gag context, however, exactly the opposite is true.  The lie is the act of speech 
that facilitates an investigation and eventual publication.  Arguably any harm from publication is 
too attenuated from the lie itself to justify depriving the lie of First Amendment protection. 




Courts have advanced several reasons why publication 
damages are not the proximate cause of newsgathering 
torts. Some follow the Food Lion district court’s 
conclusion that the acts of the plaintiff depicted in the 
publication are the real proximate cause of publication 
damages, rather than newsgathering torts that merely 
facilitated access to learning about those acts. Others give 
no reason at all.314 
 
As explained immediately above, lies that do not implicate the 
essential qualifications or functions of the job, but rather omit or 
affirmatively conceal journalistic or investigative motives, do not 
proximately cause harm by exposing unsavory or criminal acts observed 
as an undercover employee.  Such investigative deceptions are surely the 
cause in fact, in the sense that it is logical to believe that an employer 
would not offer a job to someone looking to document and expose 
unseemly or illegal industry practices.  But the lie to gain employment in 
these contexts does not produce any legally cognizable harm because the 
lie is not the proximate cause of any reputational injury.  An action is said 
to be the legal or proximate cause of harm only if it causes the harm 
through a “natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient 
intervening cause.”315  Stated differently, the law of causation and the 
First Amendment cannot countenance a system in which the exposure of 
one’s wrongdoing is treated as an actionable cause of the injury that flows 
from the exposure.316  To imagine such a regime of free speech law is to 
turn the First Amendment on its head insofar as the more newsworthy 
and politically salient the investigative publication – the more effective 
the investigation and the more damaging its revelations – the lower the 
First Amendment protection and the more likely there would be 
                                                                                                     
314 Nathan Siegel, Publication Damages in Newsgathering Cases, 19 COMM. LAW. 11, 15 
(2001) (“One reason the means by which raw information is obtained is not the proximate cause 
of publication damages is because that raw information harms no one. Rather, damage is caused 
by the way that information is subsequently presented in the publication, including the meaning 
that the publication ascribes to it editorially. Thus, the content and viewpoint of the ultimate 
publication, and the decisions made to express that content, are the proximate causes of 
publication damages.); id. (“inherent in the concept of proximate cause is that something more 
than literal causation is required. In addition, policy judgments must be made about the 
appropriate allocation of responsibility for harms involving a particular course of conduct.”). 
315 James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 185 n.99 (1925). 
316 The illegal or unsavory acts documented by an undercover investigator are the intervening 
cause that breaks the chain.  If an investigator gains employment at a childcare facility and 
documents unsafe or criminal interactions with the children, neither the recording nor the recorder 
are the cause of the harm that will flow to the business; rather the practices which are exposed are 
the cause of harm. 
64                       HIGH VALUE LIES [24-Mar-15 
 
damages.317  By such logic an undercover investigation showing that a 
business is an ongoing criminal enterprise would be less protected than 
an investigation that did not reveal any wrongdoing.     
Defenders of Ag Gag laws and similar prohibitions might argue that 
the actual cause of cognizable harm to a business is the editing of the raw 
footage showing wrongdoing.  Indeed the history of Ag Gag laws is 
replete with references to the fact that the agricultural industry and their 
supporters view with great suspicion the editing that investigators in these 
industries conduct before publishing the videos.318  Legislators and 
industry representatives have repeatedly referred to the investigations as 
orchestrated or staged, and on this basis justified the Ag Gag laws.  Of 
course, if the harm is staged or unfairly edited videos, then “the real 
conduct being challenged . . . .  is editorial conduct, not newsgathering 
[and] . . . publication damages should only be permitted through the tort 
that challenges those decisions directly, defamation, rather than through 
fraud or trespass claims that have nothing to do with editorial content.”319  
Bypassing the limits on defamation liability by using other tort claims is 
already prohibited under the common law, and when the circumvention 
of defamation limits takes the form of a criminal statute, the First 
Amendment concerns are even greater. 
To state the matter as plainly as possible, even if one could say that 
the lie causes harm by making possible the recordings and eventual media 
attention, the resulting reputational harm to the investigated business is 
not a cognizable injury.  The Supreme Court has been steadfast in holding 
that the First Amendment limits on defamation actions apply to all tort or 
criminal actions that attempt to prevent reputational injuries based on 
publication.320 If the ultimate harm flowing from the lie is damage to 
                                                                                                     
317 Siegel, supra note 331, at 15 (2001) (“companies would receive compensation for the 
public's refusal to tolerate their potentially antisocial conduct”). 
318  Susie Cagle, Two Views on ag-gags: The investigator and the farm advocate, GRIST (Apr. 
25, 2013), http://grist.org/food/two-views-on-ag-gags/; Debate: After Activists Covertly Expose 
Animal Cruelty, Should They Be Targeted With “Ag-Gag” Laws?, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/debate_after_activists_covertly_expose_animal. 
319  Siegel, supra note 331, at 15; id. at 16 (noting that in the context of privacy torts – such 
as intrusion upon seclusion – the limits on damages are less clear, but explaining that, in part, 
based on the dated nature of the precedent that predates cases like Hustler); id. (“Dietemann was 
decided before much of the First Amendment jurisprudence related to publication damages was 
developed. Moreover, the question of whether publication damages should be rejected on 
proximate cause grounds was not raised or addressed. Thus, Dietemann did not address the 
principal issues currently relevant to publication damages, and its authority may reasonably be 
questioned on that ground alone.”). 
320  See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1967); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (holding that damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
based on publication are unavailable unless the preconditions for defamation liability, including 
actual malice, are satisfied).  See also Sims, supra note 170, at 511 (“Food Lion argued that its 




reputation caused by publication of truthful information, then falsity of 
the publication and malice, among other things, are constitutional 
prerequisites for liability.321  The lies used to facilitate access to a 
business (the conduct of producing the undercover investigation) no less 
than the production of the video itself, are insulated from civil or criminal 
liability by the First Amendment’s stringent limits on defamation.322   To 
hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the entire line of the Court’s 
First Amendment defamation cases, which assume the speech is false.  
Indeed, it is likely that the agricultural industry’s push for Ag Gag laws 
is a direct response to the fact that they are unable to seek relief under 
defamation law because the information revealed by undercover 
investigations is truthful. 
Moreover, the Court has recognized that the publication of truthful 
information about a matter of public significance, even if obtained 
unlawfully, may still be protected by the First Amendment.  In Bartnicki 
v. Vopper,323 the Court held that the media’s publication of the contents 
of a cellphone conversation regarding a highly contentious union 
negotiation were protected by the First Amendment, even where the 
media had reason to believe that the conversation was illegally 
intercepted and recorded.  While it did not categorically conclude that all 
publications of truthful information are constitutionally protected, it 
adhered to its practice in past cases that “‘if a newspaper lawfully obtains 
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state 
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, 
absent a need . . . of the highest order.’”324  
If lying is protected insofar as it does not cause cognizable injury, and 
if publication harms short of defamation are generally not cognizable, 
then lying for investigative purposes of facilitating a politically 
                                                                                                     
enormous financial losses were proximately caused by the PrimeTime Live broadcast and should 
properly have been included in its compensatory damage award.”).  
321 Sims, supra note 170, at 556-57 (“In Food Lion, . . . injury to reputation--was an issue in 
the case [and] Judge Tilley therefore recognized that Food Lion's attempt to link its reputational 
injuries to the damages caused by the newsgathering torts without proving falsity or actual malice 
was, in fact, an attempt to circumvent Gertz and Sullivan.”). 
322  Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the 
Refortification of Defamation Law's Constitutional Aspects, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 665, 666 (1989) 
(“Recent years have witnessed attempts by plaintiffs to make an end-run around the obstacles 
posed by defamation law's harm to reputation element and its constitutional aspects.”); Food Lion, 
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522 (1999) (“What Food Lion sought to do, then, 
was to recover defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims, without satisfying 
the stricter (First Amendment) standards of a defamation claim. We believe that such an end-run 
around First Amendment strictures is foreclosed by Hustler.”). 
323  532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001). 
324  Id. at 528 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). 
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significant investigation will generally be protected speech.  The lie told 
by an undercover investigator – denying a desire to document food safety 
issues, for example – does not cause a harm other than those caused by 
the ultimate publication, and such injuries are not legally cognizable if 
the publication is non-defamatory.325   
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Lies play a surprisingly and historically important role in uncovering 
truth.  Investigative deceptions are the hallmark of the muckraking 
tradition.  Since the time of Upton Sinclair’s work at a slaughterhouse, 
gaining access or even employment through deception, has led to 
landmark legislative reforms, shaped public opinion, and ignited political 
debate.  These tactics are now routinely used by political activists as well.  
More recently, these efforts to produce political speech on matters of 
wide public concern by gaining access through lies have been the target 
of a rash of criminal statutes.  Over the past few years, dozens of states 
have considered legislation that criminalizes misrepresentations used to 
gain access for purposes of investigations of the agricultural industry.  A 
handful of states have actually enacted the laws, with other poised to do 
the same.  These Ag Gag laws present a timely opportunity to consider 
the degree of constitutional protection for lies.   
 Whatever the ultimate status of lies generally under the First 
Amendment, investigative deceptions are high value lies, and laws 
regulating them should be subject to the most exacting constitutional 
scrutiny.  For decades lies have all been clumped into a dichotomy – that 
is lies are either entirely unprotected, or they are a form of speech that is 
disfavored, but protected insofar as is necessary to avoid chilling valuable 
speech.  By comprehensively identifying the doctrinal and historical case 
for recognizing distinct value in investigative deceptions, this Article 
destabilizes the misconception that all lies are equal.  Many lies are 
entitled to First Amendment protection, but no lie is more valuable than 
the lie that enables important speech on issues of public concern.  High 
value lies have evaded judicial attention for too long, and with the rise of 
Ag Gag laws their time in the First Amendment spotlight has finally 
arrived.  As we demonstrate, in the context of lies, the First Amendment 
critically intersects with the law of causation, and because the harm 
flowing from an investigation is linked to publication or exposé and not 
the lie itself, investigative deceptions are entitled to strict scrutiny. 
                                                                                                     
325  One could imagine that if the investigator not only lies but stages the reported conduct, 
then damages would exist.  Cf.  Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 
1125, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that when the “unedited footage” from an undercover 
investigation  would show that the publication created a “false impression”, then an action for 
defamation is colorable). 
